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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

13 October 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John H. Stein  
Acting Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : [ ] Report

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Page 1 of 119 Pages

TOP SECRET

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121 PP



## Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 119 Pages

COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT

DATE OF  
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SUBJECT

Critique of the Operational-Strategic Command-Staff Exercise ZAPAD-77

SOURCE Documentary

### Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of the TOP SECRET official critique of ZAPAD-77, a major operational-strategic command-staff exercise held in May and June 1977 to test the establishment of a high command in the Western theater. The critique itself consists of two comprehensive and unusually candid reports which provide an indication of the level of proficiency of the commanders and staffs taking part in the exercise and the state of troop control and combat readiness in the Polish, Czech, East German and Soviet military units allocated to the Combined Armed Forces in the theater. The Chief of the Soviet General Staff describes the scenario and course of the exercise and the actions taken by the participants, giving a general assessment of results and indicating shortcomings in the performance of individual tasks. The Soviet Defense Minister's report approaches the exercise from the strategic requirements on which it was based and deals with the performance of senior Warsaw Pact command figures in applying strategic concepts in planning and in using the combat arms and services to best advantage in a theater operation. Graphics illustrating various aspects of the exercise accompany the critique.

End of Summary

TS #788301  
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TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 4 of 119 Pages

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR

TOP SECRET

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MATERIALS  
OF THE CRITIQUE OF THE OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC  
COMMAND-STAFF EXERCISE  
ZAPAD-77

MOSCOW 1977

TS #788301  
Copy # 17

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 3 of 119 Pages

## CONTENTS

1. Opening address of the exercise director, Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. USTINOV
2. Report of the chief of staff of the directing body, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. OGARKOV
3. Report of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. USTINOV

## LIST OF CHARTS\*

1. Initial operational-strategic situation in the exercise ZAPAD-77 for 31 May
2. Concept of the operational-strategic command-staff exercise ZAPAD-77
3. Decisions of the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Fronts to repel the enemy invasion
4. Decision of the commander of the Combined Baltic Fleet on the conduct of combat actions
5. Relocation of control posts of the fronts during regrouping
6. Table of working time indicators of the commanders and staffs of the fronts and armies when making decisions and planning the repulse of the enemy invasion and the regrouping
7. Decisions of the front commanders on commitment to the engagement and conduct of the offensive operation
8. Decisions of the front commanders concerning the situation at 2000 hours on 10 June
9. Basic diagram of the playing out of combat actions in exercise ZAPAD-77

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\* Charts are enclosed in a separate folder.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS #788301  
Copy # 14

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 6 of 119 Pages

OPENING ADDRESS

of the Exercise Director, Minister of Defense of the USSR,

Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. USTINOV

Comrades:

We have conducted a great, very necessary and useful operational-strategic command-staff exercise with the participation of the leadership and the operational staffs of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, the Polish Armed Forces, the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, and the Czechoslovak People's Army. It was the main combined operational training undertaking of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states in 1977.

We regard this exercise as an example of the close combat cooperation of our armies and their endeavor to further raise the level of combat readiness and strengthen our defensive alliance, the Warsaw Pact.

The need to conduct this exercise is determined by both political and military circumstances. In the first place, we are forced to seriously reckon with the constant increase of military preparations of the USA and the NATO countries directed against our socialist commonwealth and with their intention to alter the balance of military forces in Europe to their own advantage.

Second, the need to conduct such an exercise is called for by the continuing process of rapid development in all fields of military affairs, by the appearance of new weapons systems and military equipment, and by the growth of the combat capabilities of the offensive and defensive means possessed by us and by the probable enemy.

All of this has a definite effect on strategy, operational art, and tactics, and it requires the solution of a number of complex theoretical and practical problems and questions associated with the preparation of our armed forces to ward off aggression and with the training and indoctrination of personnel.

TS #788301  
Copy # 14

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 7 of 119 Pages

Before we begin the critique, it is with a sense of great responsibility and satisfaction that I carry out an honor entrusted to me: I convey to you, and through you to all the participants in the exercise, greetings and wishes of great success in the work of strengthening the combat might of our armed forces from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, from the Soviet government, and personally from the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Defense Council of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade Leonid Ilich BREZHNEV. (Applause.)

Permit me also to convey to you sincere greetings from the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Erich HONECKER, from the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Comrade Edward GIEREK, and from the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Comrade Gustav HUSAK. (Applause.)

On behalf of the participants in the exercise, I welcome the defense ministers here present from the German Democratic Republic, General of the Army Comrade Heinz HOFFMANN (applause), from the Polish People's Republic, General of the Army Comrade Wojciech JARUZELSKI (applause), and from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, General of the Army Comrade Martin DZUR (applause), who have actively participated in the conduct of our exercise.

We likewise welcome our comrades in arms from the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. (Applause.)

There were specialists in the field of automated control systems development taking part in the exercise. We also welcome them in this hall. (Applause.)

Let us turn to the concluding stage of our exercise, the critique of its organization, progress, and results obtained.

TS #788301  
Copy # 14

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 8 of 119 Pages

At this time, of course, we can provide only tentative results of the exercise. During it we accomplished a number of complex tasks and obtained no small amount of important materials, which must be collated and thoroughly studied and the appropriate conclusions drawn. All that is useful we must exploit in the practice of operational, combat, and political training, as well as in the refinement of operational-strategic calculations and in the working out of the problematic questions of military theory.

The floor yields for the report of the chief of staff of the directing body, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade Nikolay Vasilyevich OGARKOV.

TS #788301  
Copy # 14

~~TOP SECRET~~



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Page 9 of 119 Pages

## REPORT

of the Chief of Staff of the Directing Body,  
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR,  
Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. OGARKOV

Comrade Defense Ministers:

Comrade Generals, Admirals, and Officers:

The operational-strategic command-staff exercise on terrain with communications means, ZAPAD-77, conducted under the direction of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Fedorovich USTINOV, is the most important of all the combined operational training undertakings of the allied armies in the past 15 years.

This exercise, in terms of both the number of participants and the nature of tasks performed, had an operational-strategic character. It not only promoted an improvement of the skills of the commanders, staffs and political organs in performing training tasks, but also made it possible to test a number of provisions of the regulations and manuals in force and to investigate certain new questions of operational art.

The exercise we conducted had three special characteristics.

First, the exercise was marked by great spatial scope. The commanders and staffs of the allied armies worked on the terrain with actual relocation of field control posts and communications centers over great distances and with the working out of training problems throughout the entire exercise on a real-time scale, "hour for hour".

Second, it was conducted on an operational-strategic training background based on one of the possible variants of combined actions of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states to ward off aggression in the Western Theater of Military Operations and, at the same time, with the actual combat strength and initial position of the sides considerably changed. This was done purposely so that commanders and staffs would get away from actions according to actual plans and show greater creativity and initiative in the search for better methods of accomplishing complex

TS #788301  
Copy # 14

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 10 of 119 Pages

operational tasks.

Third, this was the first time in the practice of our combined undertakings that we studied in detail such a form of combat employment of our armed forces as a strategic operation in a continental theater of military operations with the participation in it of coalition groupings of troops and the establishment of a high command in the theater, a role which was performed by the staff of the directing body. This does not rule out, however, that the staff of the high command of troops in the theater of military operations might in the future be the trainee role. \*

In the course of the exercise we worked out nearly all the forms and methods of combat employment of operational formations: repulse of an enemy invasion and conduct of a defense with delivery of army and front counterattacks; execution of regroupings of troops over a great distance and commitment of them to the engagement; conduct of air and air defense operations; conduct of combat actions to gain supremacy in the air and on the sea; development of an offensive with the use of conventional and nuclear weapons; and many other matters. All of this promoted the further combat integration of the higher staffs of the fraternal armies and the improvement of their operational proficiency and combat readiness.

Of course, it is still difficult at this time to draw final conclusions and make definite recommendations about the results of the exercise conducted. Many of the questions we were studying are complex and require additional testing and research in other operational training undertakings of the fraternal armies. Therefore, when we examine the progress of the exercise and sum up its results today, as the exercise director mentioned in his opening words, we can express tentative conclusions and observations about only a few of these matters.

#### I. CONCEPT AND PLAN OF CONDUCT OF THE EXERCISE

Theme of the exercise: Deployment of groupings of the armed forces in the Western Theater of Military Operations, repulse of an enemy invasion, and commitment of operational reserves to the engagement. Development of an offensive under conditions of the use of nuclear weapons.

TS #788301  
Copy # 14

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 11 of 119 Pages

Training objectives set for the exercise were:

- to give commanders and staffs practice in making decisions, planning, and controlling troops while preparing and carrying out operations and regroupings of troops;
- to perfect the methods of organizing cooperation among fronts, branches of the armed forces, and allied troops;
- to test the current system of troop control on the western axis in order to work out recommendations for further perfecting it.

Called on to participate in the exercise were:

- operations groups of the general staffs of the Polish Armed Forces and the Czechoslovak People's Army and the Main Staff of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic;
- five field headquarters of fronts (front headquarters of the Polish Armed Forces, headquarters of the Western Military District of the Czechoslovak People's Army, of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, of the Belorussian Military District, and of the Carpathian Military District), headquarters of the Baltic Fleet with operations groups of the Navy of the Polish People's Republic and the People's Navy of the German Democratic Republic;
- headquarters of three separate armies (3rd Military District of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, Northern Group of Forces, and Central Group of Forces);
- fifteen headquarters of combined-arms armies, tank armies, air armies, missile formations, and air defense armies.

Also taking part in the exercise were the civil defense staffs of the western oblasts of the Ukraine and Belorussia and operations groups of the headquarters of the Belorussian and Carpathian Military Districts.

Acting in the role of senior umpires attached to the fronts, armies, and the Baltic Fleet were the deputy commanders-in-chief of the [Soviet] Ground Forces and Navy and the commanders of the Baltic and Kiev Military Districts with their operations groups as well as army commanders from a number of the western military districts.

TS #788301  
Copy # 14

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 12 of 119 Pages

The initial situation (Chart 1) was drawn up for 31 May, i.e., three or four days before the start of the war. The provisional national border between the sides ran along the line Rostok--Leipzig--Pilsen, 100 to 150 kilometers east of its actual position.

West by this time had completed secret mobilization and, under the guise of exercises, was carrying out the operational deployment of its troops and naval forces in the Central European Theater of Military Operations and the Atlantic Ocean. Altogether, 85 divisions had been deployed and 3,700 combat aircraft and over 450 combat ships concentrated in the Central European Theater of Military Operations.

There was concentrated in the first operational echelon on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark a strong grouping of 60 divisions and over 15,000 tanks and 9,500 pieces of artillery, which amounted to over 70 percent of all its forces and means deployed in the Central European Theater of Military Operations.

West had 25 divisions of the other NATO countries in reserve in the Central European Theater of Military Operations.

East, having established that West was preparing to start a war, on 28 May began secret mobilization and deployment of its troops and naval forces.

Having a number of forces and means approximately equal to West's in its grouping in the Western Theater of Military Operations, East had, on 31 May, concentrated only about 40 percent of its troops in the first echelon. The rest of the forces were located in the depth, from 300 to 1,200 kilometers away; and the 45th Army was 1,500 kilometers from the operational assignment areas.

Thus, with a nearly equal overall balance of forces, West had effected a 50-percent superiority over the troops of the first operational echelon of East (2nd and 3rd Fronts and 28th Army), and on the axis of operations of its attack groupings a three- and even fivefold superiority.

In this situation, by decision of the Supreme High Command, the Polish Armed Forces, the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, and the Western Military District of the Czechoslovak People's Army were reorganized into the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Fronts, respectively; the Belorussian and Carpathian Military Districts into the 4th and 5th Fronts; the Northern Group of Forces, the Central Group of Forces, and the 3rd Military District of the National

TS #788301  
Copy # 14

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 13 of 119 Pages

People's Army of the German Democratic Republic into the 23rd, 28th, and 9th Armies, respectively; and the Baltic Fleet into the Combined Baltic Fleet with the inclusion of the Navy of the Polish People's Republic and the People's Navy of the German Democratic Republic. Control of this whole grouping was exercised by the commander-in-chief in the Western Theater of Military Operations with headquarters in the city of Legnica (Polish People's Republic).

Taking account of the developing situation, the sides made these plans (Chart 2):

West, carrying out the deployment of its operational groupings under the guise of preparation for a major strategic exercise, planned to rout the opposing troops of the 2nd and 3rd Fronts and the 28th Army through powerful surprise splitting attacks on a wide front before the approach of East's operational reserves and, developing the offensive, to take the territory of the German Democratic Republic and the western areas of Czechoslovakia and Poland by the end of the sixth or seventh day. Simultaneously, through air strikes and actions of airborne landing forces and sabotage and reconnaissance groups, to prevent the movement of East's second-echelon fronts into the area of combat actions. Then, after building up forces through commitment of the operational reserves to the engagement, with attacks by the two main groupings from the area west of Gdansk and the area west of L[osice?] in the general direction of Brest, with part of the forces in the directions of Kaliningrad and Lvov, to rout East's advancing operational reserves in meeting engagements and get to the western borders of the Soviet Union.

East completed full mobilization of its troops and naval forces by 31 May and, in order to thwart the aggression, began their operational deployment and movement of the main groupings of the 4th and 5th Fronts into the western areas of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

East's plan called for repelling West's attacks and then, through commitment to the engagement of the reserve fronts and armies that had arrived, seizing the initiative and routing the groupings of the first operational echelon of West's troops that had invaded our territory, and going over to a counteroffensive.

Subsequently, to hit the advancing and newly activated operational reserves of the enemy and conclude the defeat of the aggressor on his territory.

TS #788301  
Copy # 14

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 14 of 119 Pages

The exercise was planned and conducted in accordance with these concepts of the sides in three stages.

The first stage was the planning of the repulse of the enemy invasion, of the deployment of naval forces, and of the regrouping of troops in the theater of military operations -- two to three days.

The second stage was the conduct of combat actions to repel the enemy invasion, the movement of the second-echelon fronts into the theater of military operations, and their commitment to the engagement -- three days.

The third stage was the transition to the offensive and exploitation of success with the use of nuclear weapons -- two days.

## II. FIRST STAGE OF THE EXERCISE

This began on 31 May, when the commanders and staffs participating in the exercise were given the operational directives:

-- the 2nd and 3rd Fronts and the 28th Army, to repel the enemy invasion;

-- the 1st, 4th, and 5th Fronts and the 9th and 23rd Armies, to carry out regroupings to the departure areas for commitment to the engagement;

-- copies of the directives to the 1st and 3rd Fronts, the 9th Army, and the Combined Baltic Fleet, as well as information on the impending regroupings of the 4th and 5th Fronts were delivered to the operations groups of the respective general staffs of the Polish Armed Forces and the Czechoslovak People's Army, and of the Main Staff of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic participating in the exercise.

Upon receipt of the directives, the commanders and staffs began planning the repulse of the invasion and the regrouping of troops in the complex situation of a period of threat.

The work of the commanders and staffs to plan the operations and regroupings of troops was done within the framework of a single strategic operation in the theater of military operations.

TS #788301  
Copy # 14

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During the exercise, the planning of the strategic operation in the theater was performed by the staff of the directing body, which acted in the role of staff of the commander-in-chief in the Western Theater of Military Operations. This was done in order to unite the efforts of all the forces and means participating in the exercise under the overall concept and to ensure precise cooperation among them and unified control over them.

As we know, the question of coordinating the efforts of troops in the operations of groups of fronts also came up during the Great Patriotic War. For this, the Supreme High Command sent to the troops General Headquarters representatives, who (especially in the third period of the Great Patriotic War) not only coordinated but also directly controlled the actions of fronts and fleets. This practice received further development during the conduct of operations to defeat the Kwantung army in 1945, when a High Command with the corresponding staff was created to control the fronts, naval forces, and aviation in the Far East.

A modern strategic operation in a theater of military operations is larger in scale and considerably more complex than the operation of a group of fronts in the last war. Therefore, it was supposed to be one of the training tasks in this exercise to study more concretely the question of the possibility and advisability of creating such commands in theaters of military operations.

In accordance with the directive of the commander-in-chief in the Western Theater of Military Operations, the 2nd and 3rd Fronts and the 28th Army were assigned the task of repelling the invasion of the enemy, inflicting damage on him, and being ready to participate in the strategic operation in the theater of military operations.

On the whole, the planning of the repulse of the enemy invasion suited the situation that had developed. The commanders of the first-echelon formations assumed that the enemy would concentrate the main efforts on the Berlin axis in the zone of the 2nd Front, north of Prague in the zone of the 28th Army, and south of Prague before the 3rd Front; and they planned combat actions in keeping with this (Chart 3).

In the 3rd Front and the 28th Army, provisions were made to set up a deeply echeloned defense with a developed system of defensive lines and positions. In the 2nd Front, the system of defense and the concept of actions of the front troops to repel the enemy invasion were not expressed precisely enough.

TS #788301  
Copy # 14

The operational disposition of troops in all the formations (2nd and 3rd Fronts and 28th Army) was in two echelons, with up to [50] percent -- in the 2nd Front 60 percent -- of the forces, predominantly tank divisions, concentrated in the depth as second echelons of the armies and fronts to deliver counterattacks.

Ahead of the first defensive line of the 2nd and 3rd Fronts and the 28th Army, a forward security zone 20 to 30 kilometers in depth was established, which was defended in the 2nd Front and the 28th Army by reinforced motorized rifle regiments -- the forward detachments of the first-echelon divisions, and in the 3rd Front (in a zone of 120 kilometers) by two motorized rifle divisions and two separate regiments.

Thus, the commanders of the fronts and the 28th Army planned to conduct an active defense and prepared the troops to go over to the offensive after repelling the enemy invasion. This method of defeating the invading troops of an aggressor on a western axis should be considered appropriate.

At the same time, mistakes were made initially in the field headquarters of the fronts and armies during the planning of defensive actions.

What were these mistakes?

First of all, the fact that, while they possessed greater capabilities, the formation commanders allocated few forces for the defense of the first defensive line, especially on the presumed axes of West's main thrust. Thus, in the 2nd Front, in a zone of over 400 kilometers, eight divisions were defending on the first line, with the efforts of the first-echelon divisions distributed almost evenly over the entire defense zone. Massing of forces and means on threatened axes was not properly provided for. Between large units, and even on the axis of the presumed main thrust of the enemy, large gaps not covered by anyone were allowed that opened a path to Berlin.

Poor densities of antitank means were established in the first-echelon divisions of the 2nd Front, although this front on the whole possessed great antitank capabilities. At the start of planning, some errors were also made in organizing cover of the national border.

TS #788301  
Copy # 17



~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 17 of 119 Pages

Clearly, more attention should have been paid to the composition of the covering troops allocated as well as to the methods of their actions and fire support.

The commander and staff of the 28th Army did not take the necessary steps to camouflage forces and means on the axis of West's main thrust. The counterattack planned by the army directed the second-echelon troops in essence toward a frontal attack on the US 7th Army Corps.

The staff of the 3rd Front initially paid insufficient attention to the organization of cooperation with the adjacent force on its right, the 28th Army, and this led to a lack of coordination in the planning of counterattacks.

The field headquarters of the fronts and the 28th Army subsequently eliminated these shortcomings.

The first-priority task of staffs in the period of threat was the intensification of reconnaissance. In this period, the formation commanders and staffs had to be sure at any price to discover the intentions of the enemy and the extent of the buildup of his groupings on land and sea, determine the time and order of their operational deployment, pinpoint the disposition and coordinates of all important targets in order to destroy them, and determine the time of the possible attack. All of this required the concrete planning and organized use of all reconnaissance forces and means.

On the whole, the staffs of the fronts and armies handled this task well. When the immediate threat of an attack by the aggressor began to arise, radio, radiotechnical, and special reconnaissance were intensified. Air reconnaissance was conducted by the fronts, fleet, and long range aviation without violation of the national border. Air reconnaissance was organized in the North Sea in support of the Combined Baltic Fleet.

In doing the reconnaissance and assessment of the enemy, the staffs of the fronts and the fleet on the whole correctly determined his strength, grouping of troops (forces), and intentions. However, conclusions about the enemy were often general, unspecific, and sometimes even erroneous. In the course of the exercise, we became convinced that not all formation commanders and staffs have mastered the art of analyzing data about the enemy. And this is really the main thing in an assessment of the enemy. Some officers have a poor knowledge of the strong and weak points of our probable enemy (2nd and 4th Fronts) and of the indications of his

TS #788301  
Copy # 14

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 18 of 119 Pages

preparation for an attack. The command of one of the fronts (3rd Front) did not give due importance to determining the time of the possible enemy attack and initially made a decision to deploy the first-echelon troops in the departure areas only by 0200 hours on 3 June, i.e., actually a mere two hours before the beginning of the enemy attack. Subsequently, in conducting a thorough analysis of the data on the enemy, the command of the front saw to the timely occupation of the assigned areas and readied the troops to repel the aggression.

In analyzing the decisions of the army commanders, it must be noted that all of them basically suited the situation that had developed. The endeavor to prepare an active defense and create a developed, deeply echeloned system of defensive lines, positions, and especially of obstacles was typical of all the army commanders. In doing this, they made extensive use of antitank reserves and mobile obstacle detachments, including in helicopters. This task was accomplished most fully in the 28th Army.

The decisions of the commanders of the separate armies of the Air Defense Forces of the Country on the whole were sound and ensured the fulfilment of the assigned tasks. However, the staffs of the armies concerned themselves little with preparing the necessary calculations to substantiate proposals for the decision. In the 14th Separate Air Defense Army, the concept of the operation and the methods of accomplishing combat tasks were formulated imprecisely. The command personnel of the 5th Air Defense Army did not completely work out the problems of planning an air defense operation, particularly the methods of qualitatively assessing the capabilities of an air enemy.

The decision of the commander of the Combined Baltic Fleet (Chart 4).

The Combined Baltic Fleet was assigned a number of important tasks: to gain and hold supremacy at sea, to destroy West's main carrier strike and ship groups, to disrupt their sea shipments, and to assist the troops of the 1st Front in taking the straits zone and in conducting combat actions on coastal axes.

The accomplishment of these tasks was planned with timeliness and sufficient completeness. At the same time, during the planning of combat actions, there were certain inadequacies in the work of the commander and staff.

Initially there was an even allocation of forces by tasks without establishment of the necessary superiority on the main axis. The

TS #788301  
Copy # 14

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Page 19 of 119 Pages

capabilities of West's tactical aviation were assessed without proper substantiation. The complexity of the mine situation in the straits zone was underestimated. The capabilities of our minesweeping forces were overrated. Questions of cooperation of the fleet with the 1st and 2nd Fronts were resolved especially poorly in the first stage. The fleet staff initially attempted to completely turn the questions of cooperation with the coastal front and the planning of the amphibious landing operation over to its operations group attached to the 1st Front, which cannot be considered correct. The staff of the Combined Baltic Fleet also engaged in the organization of radioelectronic warfare in a clearly inadequate and purely theoretical way.

Planning of regroupings of troops over a considerable distance.

The troops of the 1st Front had to carry out a movement over a distance of 300 to 430 kilometers; the 4th and 5th Fronts over distances of 800 to 1,200 kilometers and -- when the 45th Army was included -- up to 1,500 kilometers.

On the whole, the planning of the troop regroupings was sensible, sound, and suited to the assigned tasks.

In each front, in order to ensure the organized movement of troops, a support echelon was created, which included covering, engineer, and chemical large units and units, the ground echelon of air armies, and units and facilities of the first echelon of the front rear services.

The main forces of each front moved forward in two echelons over eight to ten routes. The day's march of the troops averaged 250 to 300 kilometers. To ensure the concealment of the regrouping of troops, their movement and concentration in rest areas proceeded predominantly during the hours of darkness.

Taking into account that the 4th and 5th Fronts were moving over territory of the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and the German Democratic Republic, their staffs paid a good deal of attention to coordination with the operations groups of the general staffs of the Polish Armed Forces and Czechoslovak People's Army, and of the Main Staff of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, as well as with the commands of the 1st and 3rd Fronts, and to the practical solution of questions of support of the regrouping, especially with respect to the negotiation of barrier lines and rear services support.

TS #788301  
Copy # \_\_\_\_\_

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 20 of 119 Pages

The operations groups of the general (main) staffs of the allied armies also did much work on the technical coverage of motor roads and railroads, the setting up of temporary transshipment areas, and the preparation of depots for the mass issue of POL. Special mention should be made of the intensive and fruitful work on the actual support of the regroupings of the staffs of the 1st, 4th and 5th Fronts, which was done by the operations group of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces headed by the Chief of the General Staff, General of Arms F. SIWICKI.

At the same time, we have a few remarks and desiderata about the planning of regroupings.

The commanders and staffs of the fronts, particularly the field headquarters of the 4th Front, when planning the regrouping of troops, did not fully accomplish the task of organized and timely rebasing of the air armies, their materiel-technical means, and support forces to the new areas. It was not taken into account that, right after regrouping, they had to take part in an air operation and in providing cover for the front troops as these were completing the movement forward and concentration.

When planning the regrouping, the front staffs underestimated the capabilities of the enemy, particularly of his aviation, to deliver strikes on the advancing troops. The allocation of air defense forces and means to cover crossings over the Vistula and Oder rivers was clearly inadequate.

Some staffs of formations in this stage failed to perform the calculations for the regrouping concretely; determination of the depth of day's marches and average travel speeds of the columns was grossly general and approximate in nature. Calculations on the time required for columns to reach the national border, as a rule, were not performed; instructions to troops, especially on the first day, were not issued in time, which led to delays in the arrival of troops at the routes assigned them and to lack of organization.

It should also be considered one of the serious shortcomings that in the 4th and 5th Fronts the questions of refueling equipment and replenishing fuel reserves during a regrouping under conditions of possible vigorous enemy actions against the front troops were not thought out thoroughly enough nor fully resolved.

In analyzing the work of the front staffs, it cannot be ignored that, unfortunately, they still poorly monitor the timely fulfilment of instructions issued to the troops. Thus, the staff of the 5th Front issued

TS #788301  
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Page 21 of 119 Pages

an instruction to the staff of the 18th Army for the 161st Motorized Rifle Division to return to the concentration area assigned it by the morning of 31 May. But, after issuing the instruction, the front staff did not follow through the monitoring of its execution; as a result, the army staff did not forward this instruction to the division commander until ten hours later, that is, at the time when the 161st Motorized Rifle Division was supposed to be in the designated area. And the number of such examples is, unfortunately, not small.

The organization of control of the advancing troops (Chart 5). Control of the forward movement of troops was organized most appropriately in the 4th Front. Before the movement began, the front command post was located in the area of Pruzhany. At the same place there was an alternate command post, at which were located 20 percent of the T/O personnel of the front headquarters. When the movement of troops began, the alternate command post with 20 percent of the operations personnel was, by decision of the commander, moved out together with the support echelon and deployed by 0200 hours 2 June in the area of the first day's halt, Skierniewice.

On the morning of 2 June, when the troops had completed the first march during the night and the heads of their columns had reached the line of the alternate command post, the front commander and 60 percent of the operations personnel were transferred there in helicopters and aircraft. This made it possible already by 0900 hours 2 June to set up a front command post on the basis of the alternate command post and to exercise the control of troops from there. After the operations personnel headed by the commander had left the command post in the area of Pruzhany, only 20 percent of the operations personnel were left there. Thus, the former command post became an alternate command post and immediately began a relocation of 800 kilometers to the area of Swietosow, where it was set up as the alternate command post of the front at 1340 hours 3 June.

Subsequently, after completion of the second and third day's marches, the front commander relocated to this area with the main body of the operations personnel. When he arrived, a front command post was set up on the basis of the alternate command post, and the command post in the area of Skierniewice became an alternate command post after the commander's departure and began relocation to the area of the next day's halt at Königsbrück Training Grounds.

The relocation of control posts was organized approximately the same way in the 1st Front as well.

TS #788301  
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Page 22 of 119 Pages

In the 5th Front, the relocation of control posts was organized differently. The command and rear control posts of the fronts were initially accommodated in fixed protected installations. Mobile control posts (command post, alternate command post, and rear control post) were in readiness to move out and then, in accordance with the decision adopted, were relocated with communications means in one column to the area of Rybnik. After they were set up and communications established, the front Commander and the main operations personnel flew to the mobile command post. When he arrived there, the alternate command post began relocation to the new area.

We feel that such a variant is also possible. But it obviously cannot be considered correct that all the control posts be relocated to a new area in one column, especially over the great distances of up to 800 kilometers. This can lead to the simultaneous incapacitation of all the control posts of the front.

It appears to us that the organization of the relocation of control posts in the 1st and 4th Fronts was the more desirable.

At the same time, it should be noted that the staff of the 4th Front during the relocation did not carry out the collection of situation data efficiently enough and had little information about the troops operating forward and adjacent units. \*

Among the shortcomings in organizing control of the advancing troops should also be listed the lengthy periods required to establish communications between the command posts and alternate command posts of the fronts as well as with the command posts of the armies after their relocation, especially in the 4th Front, which led to a temporary loss of communications (command post of the 4th Front with the command post of the 32nd Army for 2.5 hours).

Communications during movement on the whole ensured control of troops. The preliminary work on and timely coordination of the questions of using channels of the national communications networks made it possible to improve the stability of communications. \*

However, in this important matter there are likewise definite shortcomings, which require our joint resolution.

The work methods of field headquarters in the first stage of the exercise. Given the limited time available, the commanders and staffs

TS #788301  
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Page 23 of 119 Pages

properly organized their work for making decisions and planning operations and regroupings. In the work of control organs, as we know, different methods can be employed: advance, successive, or parallel. However, in this situation, with extremely limited time for the organization of operations and regroupings, the parallel work method was the most proper.

This method saves considerable time and permits all the work to make decisions, plan operations, and also to organize cooperation and preparation of troops for combat actions to be carried out almost simultaneously (with some concessions) at all control levels from top to bottom on the basis of the preliminary instructions received from the superior commander, which are to be issued immediately after the concept of the operation or regrouping is determined.

Of course, under different situational conditions it goes without saying that control organs may employ other methods of work -- successive or advance. You know these well.

Many staffs employ the parallel work method confidently enough. Time \* indicators of the work of staffs to plan and deliver tasks to the troops by this method in our exercise are shown in Table 6. An average of 1.5 to two hours was spent on working out the concept. The front and fleet commanders adopted decisions in five to eight hours after receiving the directive. After this, conveying tasks to the troops took one to two hours, but in individual cases tasks were conveyed to the armies in four to six hours (2nd Front to 9th Tank Army in five hours and 35 minutes). The planning of the regroupings of troops was carried out by the staff of the 1st Front in 19 hours, and by the staffs of the 4th and 5th Fronts in 22 hours. The staffs of the 2nd and 3rd Fronts spent 24 hours on planning to repel the enemy invasion.

On the whole, the field headquarters of the fronts in the exercise spent no more than a day on the average to plan combat actions and regroupings. This time is acceptable and realistic, and it may be considered indicative of the good work of the staffs.

However, in some of the staffs, especially of the 2nd Front, the quality of planning did not always measure up to the demands one could make on it. In this connection, I would have you recall that the recommendations of the General Staff on the time indicators of the work of field headquarters to plan operations were given as tentative. They must be defined more precisely for commanders and chiefs of staff in keeping with the training level of the staffs so as to unconditionally ensure high

TS #788301  
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Page 24 of 119 Pages

quality in the planning of impending operations.

In all cases, it is necessary to devote as much time to determining the concept of an operation or regrouping as is needed for a well-founded resolution of the main questions of organization of the operation. The main thing here is that the working out of it must be done by the commander personally. Let me emphasize -- personally, with the aid of his closest assistants. If the concept begins to be worked out by the method, "Here is our task; prepare the proposals for me," nothing will come of such a method. For the development of the concept is based on precisely this personal work of the commander with the aid of his chief of staff and closest assistants in a work (comradely) situation.

At the conclusion of the first stage, the directing body built up the situation and worked out the movement forward and deployment of West's troops in the border zone for an invasion.

This was due to the fact that West, having established that our reserve fronts, which had actually crossed the borders of Poland and Czechoslovakia on the night of 1 to 2 June, were moving forward, and exploiting the readiness of its troops for the invasion, decided to begin military actions a day earlier, on the morning of 3 June, in order to defeat the main groupings of the 2nd and 3rd Fronts before the approach of our operational reserves.

From 2100 hours 2 June to 0400 hours 3 June, the troops of West's Northern and Central Army Groups carried out the movement and deployment of their troops and naval forces up to East's national border.

### III. SECOND STAGE OF THE EXERCISE: CONDUCT OF COMBAT ACTIONS TO REPEL THE ENEMY INVASION, MOVEMENT FORWARD OF RESERVE FRONTS, AND COMMITMENT OF SECOND-ECHELON FRONTS TO THE ENGAGEMENT

At 0400 hours 3 June, West carried out a powerful surprise artillery strike on the covering troops of the 2nd and 3rd Fronts and the 28th Army and at 0420 hours went over to the offensive and invaded the territory of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, starting the war. At the same time they began a massed air strike, employing over 1,200 aircraft of tactical and carrier-based aviation. Over 600 of these aircraft delivered strikes against the troops and airfields of

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Page 25 of 119 Pages

East's first operational echelon. The remaining aviation operated against the reserves, advancing fronts, and rear services facilities. The playing out of combat actions in the border engagement was carried on until 0800 hours 3 June.

In this period, East's troops and naval forces repelled the invasion and massed air raid of the enemy.

While working out this training problem, some commanders and staffs of armies and fronts permitted quite a few conventionalities and reacted poorly to changes in the situation in a number of cases, failing to demonstrate high efficiency in collecting data, analyzing the situation, and taking the appropriate steps during the development of the border engagement.

In a period of threat it is very important to determine the time of the beginning of war and react to this in time, including through the change of command posts, siting areas, and troop concentration areas. Thus, for instance, the commander of the 28th Army, having determined that the possible time of the enemy attack was 3 June, requested permission and changed the location of the command post a day before the invasion, that is, on 2 June. There can be no doubt that he acted in a proper and timely manner.

At the same time, many did not do this. As a result, the enemy, having data about the locations of the control posts, targeted helicopter landing forces, sabotage groups, and air strikes to destroy them, which happened, for example, to the command post of the 2nd Front. At 0800 hours 3 June, the enemy made an attack on it, disrupted control, and forced the commander of the front to hurriedly change command posts after transferring control of the front troops (for the time of relocation) to the alternate command post.

At 1000 hours 3 June, after the training problem of repelling the enemy invasion had been worked out, there was an operational transition of two days and the situation by 1000 hours 5 June was given.

According to the content of this transition, West had, during the two days gone by, invaded the territory of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on the Szczecin, Berlin, Dresden, and Prague axes and pushed East's troops 60 to 80 kilometers into the depth. West was attempting to split up the groupings of the 2nd and 3rd Fronts and the 28th Army and destroy them in detail, get to the east bank of the Oder

TS #788301  
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Page 26 of 119 Pages

before the approach of the reserve fronts, and simultaneously disrupt the organized advance of the troops of the 4th and 5th Fronts.

Under these conditions, East was concentrating its main efforts with the forces of the first operational echelon on not letting the enemy exploit his success, weakening his missile/nuclear and aviation groupings, and simultaneously ensuring the faster completion of the regrouping of the reserve fronts and their commitment to the engagement.

However, the situation of East's first-echelon fronts was rather complicated. In the armies of the 2nd and 3rd Fronts, the second echelons had been committed to the engagement and the fronts had limited reserves at their disposal. Of the three fronts moving up to the theater of military operations, only the troops of the 1st Front had completed concentration in the assigned area by this time. The 4th Front was on a day's march from the final concentration area, and the 5th Front had been delayed by massed air strikes and the actions of sabotage and reconnaissance groups in the foothills of the Sudeten and Western Carpathian mountains.

In this situation, the commander-in-chief in the theater of military operations assigned these tasks:

-- To the 1st Front, to incorporate the 7th Army Corps of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic with the defense zone it was to occupy, to join the engagement on the Jutland axis, and, in cooperation with the 2nd Front, to inflict damage on the Northern Army Group of the enemy. Simultaneously, in conjunction with the Combined Baltic Fleet, to carry out an amphibious landing operation in order to take the straits zone and, developing the offensive, to take the Jutland peninsula. In the interests of accomplishing this task, provisions were made for the landing of an airborne division on the islands of the straits zone.

-- To the 2nd and 3rd Fronts, to inflict damage on the opposing enemy and, in conjunction with the 1st and 4th Fronts, to go over to the offensive. The 23rd and 28th Armies, respectively, were transferred to them from the reserve.

-- To the 4th Front, to speed up its advance and join the engagement on the Eisenach axis. The 9th Army of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic was resubordinated from the 2nd Front to the 4th Front and, upon joining the engagement, so was the 10th Army from the 2nd Front. The 11th Tank Army was removed to the reserve of the High Command

TS #788301  
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Page 27 of 119 Pages

in the theater of military operations.

-- To the 5th Front, to take the necessary steps for the quickest negotiation of the Sudeten Mountains and the Western Carpathians and to continue moving forward to the area east of Prague.

The decisions of the commanders of the first-echelon fronts basically amounted to inflicting damage on the main enemy groupings through counterattacks, to not letting them advance further, and to ensuring the commitment of the reserve fronts to the engagement.

The commander of the 1st Front, in order to prevent the advance of the enemy to the Oder River and to ensure the commitment of the main forces of the front to the engagement, moved two divisions out to the Szczecin axis at 1830 hours on 5 June and committed them to the engagement, which was timely and unquestionably correct in the situation that had developed.

The commander of the 2nd Front decided to deliver a counterattack on the morning of 6 June on the Magdeburg axis with the forces of the 22nd Army on the flank of the Berlin grouping of the enemy. Simultaneously to deliver an attack with the forces of the 3rd Tank Army and the 10th Army in converging directions on the Dresden axis against the flanks of the US 5th Army Corps. In all, six divisions participated in the front counterattack, three of them tank divisions. This decision completely suited the situation that had developed.

The decision of the commander of the 3rd Front likewise provided for the delivery of a counterattack on the Pilsen axis with the second-echelon forces of the front, the 5th Army, for the purpose of splitting up the enemy attack grouping (the 2nd and 8th Army Corps of the Federal Republic of Germany) and getting to the national border. The front also simultaneously allocated part of the forces of the 4th and 7th Armies for the counterattack, for a total of seven divisions, five of them tank divisions.

The commanders made massive use of "front and army aviation" and artillery on the axes of the front counterattacks, endeavoring through decisive actions to inflict damage on the enemy and create conditions for developing the offensive. A word must be said in this connection about the decision of the 10th Army commander, who dissipated his forces since he attempted to accomplish three tasks simultaneously -- prevent the encirclement of the army, unblock the 38th Motorized Rifle Division, and destroy an enemy airborne landing force.

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During the repulse of West's attack there arose the critical question of improving the effectiveness of combat with tank groupings that had broken through. A large role in this belongs to the mobile antitank reserves, especially to such means as combat helicopters. Army aviation is capable of inflicting serious damage on tank groupings, but this largely depends on the organization of control of aviation. The present system of control, as the experience of exercises has shown, is still imperfect: much time has been wasted on calling out the helicopters. The subordination of army aviation simultaneously to the commander of the air army and the commander of a combined-arms (tank) army complicates control. It is clearly necessary to study this important question more thoroughly and resolve it in the near future. There are different opinions and proposals on this problem. One of them, for example, amounts to having in the front (military district), instead of a commander of the air army, a commander of front air forces -- a front deputy commander for aviation with his own staff -- as is the case with control of the rocket troops and artillery on the part of the chief and staff of the front rocket troops and artillery. In combined-arms and tank armies, it is proposed to make the present combat control centers organic to these armies, with the availability of several combat control groups in them to work jointly with the staffs of the tank and motorized rifle divisions. There are other proposals, too. These proposals obviously should be synthesized and their feasibility tested in practice, with one or two military districts being changed over to an experimental organization taking them into account.

In the situation that had developed for East on 5 June, timely commitment of the second-echelon fronts to the engagement while the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Fronts simultaneously went over to the offensive was especially important (Chart 7).

The first of the second-echelon fronts committed to the engagement was the 1st Front.

By decision of the commander of the 1st Front, the commitment of the main forces was done successively (two divisions on 5 June at 1830 hours, and two more divisions of 6 June at 2000 hours). This procedure of commitment of the main forces of the 2nd and 3rd Armies was not caused by any acute necessity and, in all probability, could not have produced tangible results in the short period of time.

Beginning on the morning of the third day of the operation (8 June), the 1st Front, in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet, planned to carry out a joint landing operation with the landing of an

TS #788301  
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TOP SECRET

Page 29 of 119 Pages

amphibious landing division, a mechanized division, and an airborne division on the island of Zealand.

Unfortunately, in the initial stage of its preparation there was no close cooperation of the staffs of the 1st Front and the Combined Baltic Fleet. One of the main questions, organization of unified centralized control of the landing operation and of precise cooperation of all the different forces, was not resolved. There was an endeavor of the front and fleet commands to accomplish their tasks independently without due coordination and agreement. This, of course, is not correct.

An amphibious, and what is more, a joint, landing operation is one of the most complex types of operation. Such an operation must be directed by the front commander personally. His deputies for the period of preparation and conduct of the landing operation, as a rule, will be, for the navy, the commander or deputy commander of the fleet and, for the air forces, the commander of the front air army. Only in this case can full mutual understanding be attained during the performance of the assigned tasks.

With all this there must be a precise delineation of functional responsibilities between the commander of the landing ship forces and the commander of the landing force during sea transit, during the landing, and during the battle for the shore. There can be no situation wherein each group of forces participating in such an operation acts in accordance with some independent plans of its own.

While the landing force is carrying out the loading of equipment and the boarding of personnel onto the transports and landing ships, control of the ship forces, air forces, and the landing force must be exercised from the shore by the commander of this operation.

Subsequently, during sea transit and with the approach of the landing force to the areas of debarkation and transfer from the transports to the amphibious landing means until they land on the shore, immediate control of aviation and of the actions of the ship groups must be exercised by the commander of the landing ship forces. At this time he becomes the main deciding figure.

With the start of the landing, the transfer of part of the landing force onto the shore, or the start of the capture of the beachhead, the commander of the landing force becomes the deciding figure, and all the supporting forces must carry out his orders and instructions, of course under the general direction of the commander of the landing operation from

TS #788301  
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TOP SECRET

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Page 30 of 119 Pages

the command post remaining behind on the shore.

In all this, cooperation must be organized with exceptional precision; one must schedule to the minute when and at what time who begins, who delivers strikes on what targets, and when the actions of some forces are replaced by the actions of other forces. Every minute must be scheduled, with the pilot knowing the actions of shipboard artillery at this moment, and the seaman knowing the actions of aviation. The commander of the landing force and the commander of the landing ship forces must, naturally, know the actions of these and the other forces. Unfortunately, when the exercise director was briefed on the decisions of the commanders of the 1st Front and the Combined Baltic Fleet, such a careful working out of all the questions of cooperation was not reported.

Because of this, the exercise director gave orders to finish up the questions of organizing and conducting such a landing operation.

Subsequently, according to the remarks of the exercise director, all of this was completed by the commanders of the 1st Front and the Combined Baltic Fleet and their staffs, and the landing operation was carried out at the established time.

The 4th Front commander's decision for commitment of the troops to the engagement provided for a thrust of the main forces, the 32nd Army and the 9th Army of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, on converging axes bypassing the city of Leipzig, in cooperation with the 2nd Front to split up the opposing enemy grouping and to encircle and destroy the forces of the 3rd and 6th Army Corps of the Federal Republic of Germany. To deliver an attack on Glauchau with the forces of the 10th Army. In connection with this, by decision of the commander-in-chief in the theater of military operations, the 3rd Tank Army, made up of four divisions, was transferred from the 2nd Front to the 4th Front.

The operational disposition of the front was planned to be in two echelons. In the first echelon were the 32nd Army, the 3rd Tank Army, the 9th Army of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, and the 10th Army; in the second echelon was the 9th Tank Army. The 109th Airborne Division was dropped on the axis of the main attack of the front in the area of Fulda.

The second echelon of the front was committed to the engagement in order to develop the offensive in the general direction of Saarbrücken.

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As a whole this decision was appropriate to the situation which had developed. However, there were certain inadequacies in the planning of the operation, of which I will speak below.

In considering the decisions of the commanders of the fronts and armies for developing the offensive, we have directed attention to the fact that fire support of the commitment to the engagement and of the breakthrough of the enemy defense, particularly the neutralization and destruction of enemy antitank means, as well as the methods of employing infantry combat vehicles in battle are given insufficient attention. This question was resolved best and most thoroughly and concretely during planning in the 28th Army. However, in many armies there was no concrete, detailed working out of fire support of the breakthrough of the enemy defense during the development of the offensive and commitment to the engagement.

A brief word about exploiting success in a front offensive operation.

In the exercise, for the purposes of exploiting success and applying pressure to the entire operational depth of the enemy, airborne landing forces in the strength of an airborne division each were landed on the axes of the main attacks of the 2nd and 4th Fronts. However, the fronts did not fully exploit the opportunities to build up efforts on these axes through wider employment of tactical airborne landing forces and vigorous use of fire support helicopter units.

At the present time our armies possess highly effective and mobile airborne troops, airborne assault large units, and combat helicopter units of army aviation. The fire and striking capabilities of the rocket troops, aviation, and artillery have grown considerably, and the range and reliability of destruction of the enemy by fire have increased. All of this enables attacking troops not only to deliver attacks from the front, but also to operate simultaneously and vigorously against the entire operational and tactical depth of an enemy defense through "envelopment by air" [vertical envelopment]. Through resolute actions of even small various-purpose landing forces, it is possible to contain the maneuvering of the enemy, disorganize control, and inflict serious harm on him.

"Envelopment by air" is an extremely promising form of maneuver, which, in our view, may become highly typical of front and army operations, in the near future. In this connection, evidently, it has become necessary to examine the question of creating new airborne assault large units and

TS #788301  
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Page 32 of 119 Pages

units and perfecting the organizational structure of the existing ones. \*

Analysis of the work of the field headquarters of the formations in this stage of the exercise gives us grounds to say that the greatest bottleneck in their work proved to be the organization and maintenance of continuous cooperation. \*

On these points, important shortcomings were noted by the exercise director in all the fronts. Here are some examples.

In planning the commitment of troops to the engagement, the commander and staff of the 4th Front, at 0050 hours 7 June, changed the 32nd Army's line of commitment and axis of offensive in cooperation with the front's 9th Army of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic. However, at 1300 hours this still had not been conveyed to the 9th Army of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic.

The landing area of the 109th Airborne Division was chosen some distance away from the axis of the offensive of the 9th Army, which was operating on the axis of the main thrust of the front. Moreover, the commander of the 30th Air Army failed to coordinate with military transport aviation the questions of support of its flight through the zone of the front.

In the 3rd Front, when the 5th Army was committed to the engagement to deliver a counterattack, it was allocated aviation resources; but the allocation of a combat control center of the 7th Air Army to the command post of this army was not provided for.

The staff of the Combined Baltic Fleet failed to coordinate with the 1st and 2nd Fronts the questions of support of the flight of fleet aviation through the zones of these fronts.

The chiefs of air defense of the 18th, 23rd, and 32nd Armies concerned themselves little with the questions of organizing cooperation with the air defense forces of the country and those of the allied armies.

In our operational training practice it is evidently necessary to pay considerably more attention to the practical working out of the organization and maintenance of continuous cooperation during an operation, to work out cooperation plans and tables in detail, and to persistently teach commanders and staffs to carefully coordinate the actions of all forces and means by targets, areas, lines, and especially by time -- by the

TS #788301  
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Page 33 of 119 Pages

day, hour, and minute. This is the most important component of the success of a modern operation or battle.

At 2000 hours 5 June (7 June in terms of the operational situation), the trainees were given an operational transition of three days -- the situation for 2000 hours 10 June, the eighth day of the war. The third stage of the exercise began.

IV. THIRD STAGE OF THE EXERCISE: TRANSITION TO THE OFFENSIVE.  
EXPLOITATION OF SUCCESS WITH THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

On the eighth day of the operation, the situation had developed wherein East, after repelling the enemy invasion, had gone over to the offensive on the Hamburg, Hannover, Frankfurt, and Munich axes and moved forward 100 to 150 kilometers in three to four days. At the same time, they were continuing successfully to carry on combat actions to take the zone of the Baltic straits.

Only on the Prague axis was East's position still difficult. The troops of the 3rd Front were here fighting heavy battles for Prague.

In East's first operational echelon were deployed four fronts (1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th), 68 divisions in all.

In the second operational echelon was the 5th Front, whose main forces were concentrated east of Prague, in readiness for commitment to the engagement.

The reserve of the High Command on the western axis consisted of the 10th Front and the 11th Tank Army.

On the whole, the situation was developing favorably for East. They had taken the strategic initiative, actually split up West's grouping, and brought about advantageous conditions for defeating it and taking the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.

West was fighting heavy defensive battles, trying to prevent the defeat of its main forces. On the Hamburg axis, the troops of the 1st Army Corps of Holland were in an encirclement. On the Hannover axis, as the result of East's deep penetration in the direction of Hannover, there had developed a threat of West's troops in the theater of military operations

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Page 34 of 119 Pages

being split up and defeated in detail.

In this situation, West adopted a decision on 10 June to go over to combat actions with the use of nuclear weapons and began immediate preparation for delivery of a massed nuclear strike. In connection with this, at 0930 hours 11 June, the General Headquarters sent the fronts and \* the Combined Baltic Fleet a directive in which the Supreme High Command, on the basis of reliable data, warned the troops and fleet forces of the enemy's preparation for a nuclear attack.

In these conditions, East's commanders and staffs in a short time had to ascertain the commencement time of the enemy nuclear attack and conduct final reconnaissance of important targets, and to bring aviation, rocket troops, and artillery to the highest level of readiness and thereby ensure timely delivery of the initial nuclear strike on the enemy.

At the same time, measures had to be taken to increase the survivability of our troops, to remove them from under the nuclear strike, and -- after its delivery -- to eliminate its aftereffects and restore the system of control and the combat effectiveness of the troops so as to preempt the enemy in going over to vigorous combat actions after the exchange of nuclear strikes. Along with this, the timely commitment of the 5th Front to the engagement had to be seen to in this complex situation.

Basically, these tasks were accomplished correctly in the fronts and \* armies, although at the same time there were shortcomings.

First, detection of the preparation and commencement of the nuclear attack.

In most of the fronts and armies, the commanders understood that West, having lost the initiative, was preparing to use nuclear weapons. The staffs of the fronts, the Combined Baltic Fleet, and the armies made timely plans in this period to intensify reconnaissance, for which a mass sortie of nearly all the organic and nonorganic units and subunits of reconnaissance aviation was organized. All other reconnaissance forces and means were likewise directed toward the accomplishment of these tasks. As a result of these efforts, the 2nd Front, for instance, in the course of one hour verified 55 targets on the basis of final reconnaissance data. Similar measures were carried out in the other fronts, too. Thirty to forty minutes before West's nuclear attack began, all the nuclear means of the fronts were brought to Readiness No. 1, and front aviation was put into the air. The preparatory measures carried out by the fronts and the fleet

TS #788301  
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Page 35 of 119 Pages

on the whole ensured the refinement of plans and the timely delivery of the initial nuclear strike on West's troops.

Second, the maximum weakening of the enemy nuclear grouping and the removal of our troops from under the nuclear strike.

All of us theoretically understand well the serious consequences of a massed nuclear strike if steps are not taken to maximally weaken the nuclear means of the enemy and to remove our troops from under the nuclear strike in time.

However, some front and army field headquarters paid insufficient attention to these two interrelated tasks. Proper steps were not taken to weaken the nuclear attack, particularly to destroy the missile/nuclear means detected.

During final reconnaissance of enemy targets prior to the delivery of the nuclear strike, control posts, missile and artillery battalions, and delivery aircraft on airfields were detected within range of our fire means capable of hitting these targets with conventional means. Unfortunately, neither aviation nor artillery nor even tactical missiles with cluster charges were used for these purposes, as a rule. Although we all theoretically know that, if they can be hit, it is necessary to destroy all important targets immediately by instruction of the army commanders and even division commanders with conventional means rather than wait until the opportunity of hitting them with nuclear weapons presents itself. ✓

Another effective method of weakening the enemy nuclear strike is mass neutralization of his systems of control of nuclear means at the outset of the nuclear strike. This measure was properly planned and implemented by the staff of the 2nd Front. In addition, by decision of the commander of the 2nd Front, a change of the siting areas of the missile brigades and nuclear artillery was organized on the night of 10 to 11 June.

At the same time, in many other staffs the change of troop concentration areas, of siting areas of missile brigades and battalions and nuclear artillery, as well as of the home airfields of delivery aircraft and command posts was not planned, which under real conditions is intolerable and fraught with serious consequences.

Third, timely delivery of the initial nuclear strike.

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Page 36 of 119 Pages

With the onset of the threat of West's nuclear attack, the front and army commanders and staffs concentrated their main attention on refining the plans for the initial nuclear strike and bringing their nuclear means to a higher level of combat readiness.

In this period, all the field headquarters of formations worked very intensively and purposefully. This work was carried out especially smoothly in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Fronts, the 9th Army of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, and the 28th Army. The work was carried on under the immediate supervision of the commanders. All the fronts carried out the refinement of plans for the initial nuclear strike and prepared for its delivery in time. During this work, however, the nuclear planning groups in the 19th and 30th Air Armies did not work smoothly enough. They did not maintain close cooperation with the staffs of the rocket troops and artillery of the fronts.

Nor can one overlook the equipping of the combat control centers of the fronts and armies and their work methods in this period. Take the 2nd Front, for instance. Here it was planned to employ around 300 nuclear warheads in the initial nuclear strike. Many of the targets slated for destruction were mobile. Their positions were constantly changing. In order to refine the plan for the initial nuclear strike, to cancel strikes on some targets and redirect the nuclear means to others in time, a great deal of work had to be performed in short periods of time.

This problem, as we have all become convinced, is hard to solve without the use of electronic computers and some decentralization of control. The question therefore comes up of the need to develop such means of automation in the field headquarters of fronts.

Fourth point: The nature of troop actions with the start of the delivery of nuclear strikes by the sides.

Having established West's immediate preparation to deliver a nuclear strike, East began delivering an initial nuclear strike against West at 1129 hours. The initial nuclear strike of the enemy occurred at nearly the same time, at 1130 hours. The commitment to action of the nuclear means of the sides took, in essence, the form of a meeting [reciprocal] strike.

West delivered a total of 680 nuclear strikes against the troops of the fronts and the Combined Baltic Fleet, and around 400 strikes on the interior of the country as far as the western oblasts of the USSR.

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Page 37 of 119 Pages

East's troops sustained considerable losses. Only 36 percent of the large units preserved their combat effectiveness. There was complete loss of combat effectiveness in 31 percent of the divisions. The other large units were limited in combat effectiveness.

Combat effectiveness was completely lost by 24 percent of the missile large units and units, and by 70 percent of the air units. Extensive zones of contamination, destruction, and fires developed in the zones of the fronts.

Nor was East's initial nuclear strike less effective. Fifteen of West's divisions completely lost combat effectiveness. The strike destroyed 30 operational-tactical and tactical missile battalions (35 percent), 14 surface-to-air guided missile battalions (33 percent), 23 percent of the tactical aviation, and 26 percent of the command posts of the formations. West lost a quarter of a million personnel.

The overall losses of the sides were nearly equal. However, East lost nearly twice as many divisions. This may be explained by the fact that, while the overall balance of nuclear forces was about equal, West had the definite superiority in tactical nuclear means. This is why it is very important to inflict the maximum damage on the tactical nuclear means of the enemy in the period of combat actions with conventional weapons before a nuclear strike has yet begun.

In spite of the complexity of the situation, commanders and staffs on the whole worked in an organized fashion in this stage. The activity of the field headquarters, particularly of the 2nd and 3rd Fronts and the 23rd Army, was permeated by the endeavor to do everything to more fully exploit the results of our nuclear strikes and preempt the enemy in going over to vigorous actions. True, all did not properly define the sequence of their work to the same extent. This work was organized best in the 2nd and 4th Fronts. In the course of two or three hours, the staffs of these fronts had gathered the main data about the situation and refined the tasks for the troops.

In accordance with the situation that had developed, the front commanders adopted the following decisions (Chart 8):

1st Front: Go over to the offensive on the morning of 12 June, delivering the main thrust toward Schwerin and Lübeck. Commit the 17th Army to the engagement on the Jutland axis on the morning of 13 June and complete the defeat of the enemy in the zone of the Baltic straits in

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Page 38 of 119 Pages

conjunction with the Combined Baltic Fleet.

2nd Front: Continue the offensive, delivering the main thrust around to the north of the Ruhr industrial area. Intensify the thrust by committing the 11th Tank Army to the engagement and, in cooperation with the 1st and 4th Fronts, complete the defeat of the main groupings of the [Northern Army Group] and Central Army Group.

4th Front: Renew the offensive with the first-echelon army large units that have preserved combat effectiveness. Through successive commitment of the second echelons of the armies to the engagement from 11 to 12 June, continue performing the assigned task in cooperation with the 109th Airborne Division, which was dropped in the area of Fulda on 11 June.

3rd Front: Go over to the offensive with the combat-ready large units on the morning of 12 June. By committing the 32nd Army Corps to the engagement, intensify their efforts and exploit success in the general direction of Mainburg. Have the 4th Army, 32nd Army Corps, and 7th Army in the first echelon, and the 5th Army in the second echelon.

The decision of the commander of the 5th Front.

It must be said that the 5th Front was in a very difficult position at this time. First of all, the front had come under a powerful air strike while it was carrying out the movement up to the areas of assignment. The situation developed in such a way that the main defiles on the paths of the movement of front troops had been destroyed and the main POL depots wiped out by air strikes, airborne landing forces, and sabotage and reconnaissance groups.

In this complex situation, the commander, field headquarters, and staff of the front took energetic steps to find possibilities of replenishing the necessary materiel by using the available reserves of adjacent fronts on the territory of the Polish People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and by airlifting fuel from a rear base, and they ensured that the troops of the front were capable, albeit with some delay, of carrying out the regrouping and getting to the assigned areas.

At this time, the commander was planning the commitment of the front troops to the engagement. His decision provided that the 5th Front would be committed to the engagement in the zone of the 28th Army, which had been

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Page 39 of 119 Pages

transferred to that front by this time. An attack was planned on the right flank with the forces of two armies -- the 18th Army and part of the forces of the 28th Army -- and on the left flank with the 43rd Army. The 13th Tank Army was in the second echelon of the front. It was to be committed to the engagement to exploit the success. When the front commander had finished planning and organizing the commitment of troops to the engagement, the enemy nuclear strike ensued and he had to largely change his decision, since the 18th Army had virtually lost combat effectiveness as a result of the enemy missile/nuclear strike. Not one of its divisions could fulfil an assigned task. In the 13th Tank Army, one division had completely lost combat effectiveness, a second was limited in combat effectiveness, and only the third was in a combat-ready condition. In this situation, the front commander made the perfectly correct decision -- to commit the front troops to the engagement and fulfil the assigned task by delivering an attack with the 28th Army reinforced with the large units and units that were still combat-effective after the delivery of the nuclear strike. The 43rd Army, which had retained combat effectiveness, could also fulfil the assigned task. The front commander decided to deliver an attack with the 28th and 43rd Armies on converging axes toward Marianske Lazne, defeat the opposing enemy grouping operating in front of the 28th Army, and continue to carry out the assigned task.

Provisions were made subsequently to restore the combat effectiveness of the troops that had been subjected to the nuclear strike, to create second echelons of the armies in five to six days, and, by committing these to the engagement, to intensify the attack in order to develop the offensive in cooperation with an airborne landing force which had been placed at the disposal of the front commander by that time.

At the same time, a number of shortcomings were noted in the work of the staff of the 5th Front.

In refining the decision for commitment of the troops of the 5th Front to the engagement, the commander and staff failed to consider realistically enough all the complexity of the situation that had developed after the enemy nuclear strikes. Nor were the questions of cooperation decided thoroughly enough. The commander of the 19th Air Army did not even know the lines and time of commitment of the armies of the front to the engagement, nor did the staff of the air army plan out the order of priority and procedure of performing the tasks assigned to aviation during the commitment of the 43rd Army to the engagement. These shortcomings were subsequently eliminated.

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Page 40 of 119 Pages

The general staffs of the Polish Armed Forces and the Czechoslovak People's Army and the Main Staff of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, in the period of mounting threat of the use of nuclear weapons by the enemy, notified their territorial troops and civil defense in time and took steps to ensure stable communications with their troops and with the state control organs.

With the delivery of the nuclear strikes, the collection of data about strikes on the troops and territories of the countries was organized; civil defense forces and means and local contingents to eliminate the aftereffects of enemy nuclear strikes were activated; and measures were taken to restore the combat effectiveness of the troops as well as to give the necessary assistance to the Soviet fronts.

The work of civil defense staffs on the situation for 2000 hours 10 June. Taking part in the performance of tasks to eliminate the aftereffects of West's nuclear attack were operations groups of the general staffs of the Polish Armed Forces and the Czechoslovak People's Army and of the Main Staff of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic under the direction of their national defense ministers, and also operations groups of the headquarters of the Belorussian and Carpathian military districts. A complex situation was created for them. However, the reaction to it was correct. The civil defense control organs of the western oblasts of the USSR handled this task well. Most outstanding was the work of the operations groups of the headquarters of the Belorussian Military District and the civil defense staff of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

After the main questions of the third stage were worked out, a stand-down on the exercise was issued by the Minister of Defense at 1730 hours 8 June.

#### V. POLITICAL WORK IN THE FIELD HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

Our staffs have vigorous, militant Party organizations at their disposal. We constantly feel the influence of these on the formation of the high ideals and professional competence of generals, admirals, and officers. And this manifested itself with new force in the exercise just completed. In the fact that stable political molding of personnel was ensured in an intense, dynamic staff work situation, that a businesslike, friendly, and, I would say -- in the good sense of the word -- easy

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Page 41 of 119 Pages

performance was observed in the overwhelming majority of headquarters teams, that officers showed a responsible attitude toward things, one cannot fail to see the ever-growing Party influence on the activity of staffs.

As we know, during a hearing by the exercise director, appropriate instructions would be given and specific observations made about the work. It is a positive point that the political departments and Party organizations conveyed these to the executors efficiently and actively helped superiors to mobilize the efforts of their officers for the quickest elimination of shortcomings. In this connection, I would particularly like to mention the political departments and Party organizations of the staffs of the Belorussian and Carpathian military districts, the Central Group of Forces, and the Baltic Fleet.

I believe that, in the accomplishment of those great and crucial tasks which confront control organs, chiefs of staff at all levels will also manage from now on to fully exploit the forces of Party organizations, their ideological potential, and organizational sense of purpose. In turn, the political organs and Party organizations of the staffs will no doubt thoroughly analyze the experience accumulated in this exercise and critically assess the individual shortcomings that occurred in order to raise still further the effectiveness of their organizational and ideological indoctrination work in staffs and headquarters teams, including work on the matters of strengthening vigilance and preserving military secrecy.

During our command-staff exercise, the intelligence activity of the enemy special services was noticeably intensified. The number of intelligence gathering trips of military intelligence personnel of the western countries increased. Enemy agent activity was stepped up. As a result of the steps taken, the spying activity of a number of special services agents of the imperialist states was suppressed.

Information has been received that the US National Foreign Intelligence Board has given instructions to the Central Intelligence Agency and the military intelligence agencies to step up work to acquire sources of information among the service personnel of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries.

At the same time, bourgeois propaganda organs are drumming up an atmosphere of terror in their own countries, depicting the armies of the socialist states in the role of aggressor.

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All of this reinforces the need for more purposeful work to indoctrinate personnel in a spirit of high political vigilance and concern for state and military secrets.

#### VI. SOME MATTERS OF STAFF WORK AND TROOP CONTROL

During the exercise, the field headquarters of the fronts and armies worked intensely and acquired good practice in planning operations and especially in controlling troops.

On the whole, all the staffs participating in the exercise saw to the adoption of well-founded decisions and to the planning of operations and troop regroupings in short periods of time. The staffs of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Fronts, the 28th Army, and the 9th Army of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic may be singled out in a good light. The operations groups of the general staffs of the Czechoslovak People's Army and the Polish Armed Forces and of the Main Staff of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic accomplished their tasks with persistence and skill.

At the same time, staff work requires further improvement. It is necessary to improve the methods of analyzing a situation, to raise the quality of operational calculations, of planning documents, and of the monitoring of performance, and to improve staff skills. In this connection, permit me to make a few remarks.

##### 1. WORK METHODS AND HABITS

What has decisive influence on the quality of work of a staff is the degree of personal participation of the commander in its training, as well as the ability of the senior personnel of staffs and branch arms to personally prepare the most important combat documents. During the exercise, unfortunately, individual chiefs limited their participation in the planning of combat actions to merely issuing instructions and to hearing and approving proposals.

Some commanders and chiefs feel for some reason that performing calculations, working out decisions, preparing directives, and developing plans is hardly more than clerical work, allegedly beneath them. This is a

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Page 43 of 119 Pages

gross misconception.

In this respect, good examples are afforded us by the experience of the Great Patriotic War, when even the plans of front and army operations were worked out personally by commanders and chiefs of staff, with a limited circle of persons involved in this work. For instance, the plan of the counteroffensive at Moscow in 1941, in spite of all the complexity of the situation at that time, was worked out on a map by the front chief of staff, General-Leytenant V. D. SOKOLOVSKIY, personally and in his own hand; and the concept was written by the front commander, General of the Army G. K. ZHUKOV, also personally and in his own hand. These documents, approved in good time by the Supreme High Commander, are kept in the General Staff Headquarters now. This example deserves imitation.

The concept of an operation, with which the development of a decision begins, must be worked out personally by the commander with the involvement of only his closest assistants. This work must be of a creative nature and allow the necessary exchange of opinions and proposals, with the use of calculations prepared by the staffs. One cannot here structure his work on the principle, "I give the orders and you carry them out." With such an approach there will be no success. And our exercise has confirmed this convincingly. There must be a friendly, creative situation, which front commanders were able to bring about so well in the years of the Great Patriotic War.

After the concept of the exercise is determined, an operational briefing of the chiefs of branch arms and services takes place, preliminary instructions are issued to the troops, and the development of the decision continues simultaneously. Upon completion of this work, the commander must be sure to personally announce his decision to the senior personnel of the field headquarters and issue the appropriate instructions on the organization of cooperation.

Unfortunately, this was not always practiced in the exercise. As a result, there were more than a few instances of a lack of coordination in the work of staffs and chiefs of branch arms, special troops, and services.

On the whole, the experience of the exercise confirmed once again that, under conditions such as those which were created during it, the method of parallel work when the operation and troop control are being organized fully justifies itself and must be genuinely mastered and perfected.

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Page 44 of 119 Pages

## 2. USE OF COMPUTERS AND COMPUTER CENTERS

In the exercise, staffs performed some of the operational calculations with the use of electronic computer equipment.

The staffs of the Belorussian Military District, the Northern Group of Forces, the Carpathian Military District, and the Combined Baltic Fleet took a step in making the transition from the solution of the simplest calculation problems on electronic computer equipment to the solution of operational problems on it. \*

Some staffs have virtually moved on to a new stage in the use of means of automation -- to automation of the collection and processing of situation data. The staff of the Carpathian Military District, in conjunction with industrial enterprises of the city of Lvov, developed, at a prepared control post, an information system that provides display of the status of troops and aviation as well as the transmission of commands to the air army command post and the staff of rocket troops and artillery to hit particularly important targets whose coordinates come in from the control post of the chief of intelligence. A system of centralized information collection has also been set up in the staff of the Baltic Fleet.

However, in staff work, the collection and processing of situation data, as previously, takes a considerable portion of the time and remains the greatest bottleneck. Therefore, in this field, as in the whole matter of improving the effectiveness of using computer equipment, there is still much work ahead, which we must carry on in close collaboration with the representatives of industry.

## 3. STAFF SKILLS

Staff work quality and staff skills are inseparable. A poorly drawn up map, lack of precision in maintaining it, errors and oversights in combat documents, and untimely conveyance of tasks to troops may lead to serious blunders. Unfortunately, in the exercise there were instances of a careless attitude toward documents being worked out.

We must pay attention to increasing staff skills in the work of the headquarters of our districts and armies. Thus, in the staff of the 2nd

TS #788301  
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Page 45 of 119 Pages

Front, due demands are not made on the work of axis officers, particularly in the operations directorate. Maps are often kept carelessly: the demarcation lines of divisions, the position of second echelons and reserves, the siting areas of missile units, and even the command posts of large units often are not plotted on them. The collection of situation data is done with much delay, sometimes as much as six hours. The axis chiefs are inadequately prepared for work with means of communications. The telegraph equipment installed at their work positions often was not working, and even in the period of final reconnaissance prior to the initial nuclear strike there was no duty shift of telegraph operators at them.

In the second stage of the exercise, many combat documents were worked out imperfectly also in the staff of the 4th Front.

The staff of the Combined Baltic Fleet, when the exercise started, worked out a great many illustrated graphic documents which in practice were not needed for the control of troops. One gets the impression that they were already worked out long ago and being exhibited at the required time.

#### 4. WORK OF STAFFS TO PREPARE TROOPS FOR COMBAT ACTIONS

Monitoring the complete and timely fulfilment of operational directives, combat orders, and instructions by the troops and assisting subordinate commanders and staffs in organizing the battle and operation and in maintaining continuous cooperation are among the important measures of the organizational work of staffs.

In the first stage of the exercise, this work was well organized by the commanders and chiefs of staff of the 4th and 5th Fronts. This was not the case everywhere, however. Some commanders and staffs plainly underestimate the importance of organizational work among the troops. Even some armies operating on the main axis were not visited by anyone from the command and staffs of the front.

Moreover, front commanders and staffs pay particularly little attention to supervision and monitoring of the execution of instructions by the air armies, to their support, and to the organization of cooperation of aviation with the ground forces. \*

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Page 46 of 119 Pages

In turn, the commanders and staffs of some air armies, as the exercise showed, do not work in close contact with the front staffs.

## 5. THE SYSTEM OF CONTROL POSTS

The experience of the exercise demonstrated that troop control with the use of a basic staff component and full-fledged communications centers at the command post and alternate command post brings about conditions for ensuring greater efficiency, flexibility, and stability of troop control. For instance, even during the sudden change of the 2nd Front's command post, the availability of a previously deployed alternate command post made it possible for the commander to quickly relocate to it and exercise uninterrupted control of the troops. During the exercise, most of the control posts were relocated two to four times over a distance of 100 to 1,200 kilometers, but instances of the loss of control for prolonged periods of time were not noted.

At the same time, one cannot justifiably underrate the forward control posts. Thus, in the 2nd Front, a forward control post was not set up at all. In other fronts, even though they were set up, they were, as a rule, not used, although in a number of instances the situation called for bringing the headquarters closer to the troops.

The presence at each command post position of 15 to 20 percent of the operations personnel headed by deputy chiefs of staff with an attached communications center has, in our view, justified itself. However, one cannot take a formal approach to determining the composition of the command post and alternate command post. It is necessary to determine their composition each time in keeping with the concrete conditions of the situation so that they are capable of fulfilling the tasks charged to them. In particular, the allocation of a combat control center and an air defense control post to the alternate command post should be considered, even though these be of reduced strength.

## 6. RADIOELECTRONIC WARFARE

There is no need to say much about the tremendous importance of this type of support. However, as the exercise showed, unfortunately, not all staffs properly perceive the tasks of radioelectronic warfare and so do not

TS #788301  
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Page 47 of 119 Pages

organize it in the proper fashion. In a number of cases, they continue as before to reduce radioelectronic warfare to electronic neutralization alone, as happened, for instance, in the staff of the 3rd Front. Since electronic countermeasures are only a part -- and, in a number of cases, by no means the main part -- of the whole array of radioelectronic warfare measures, radioelectronic warfare must necessarily include reconnaissance and analysis of the radioelectronic situation in the zone of the front, destruction by fire of the most important detected electronic means and installations of the enemy, electronic neutralization of his navigation systems and troop and weapons control systems, protection of our own radioelectronic means, and electromagnetic compatibility, as well as countermeasures against the technical reconnaissance of the enemy.

This is the array of measures which radioelectronic warfare must embrace. Radioelectronic warfare is not merely nor so much a technical service as an operational-technical one. It is the radioelectronic warfare service which must constantly and efficiently analyze the whole radioelectronic situation in the zone of the front, determine the most important control centers and installations on which the stability of control of the combat actions of the opposing enemy depends, and prepare and present to the chief of staff and commander of the front proposals on what control centers, posts, and installations must be destroyed (by aviation, rocket troops, artillery, sabotage groups, etc.) and what ones it is advisable to neutralize with the means of radioelectronic warfare.

It is likewise necessary to determine beforehand what measures must be carried out to protect our own radioelectronic means from being counteracted by the electronic neutralization means of the enemy and to ensure the electromagnetic compatibility of our own great mass of radioelectronic means of the different armed forces branches and branch arms.

One of the substantial deficiencies in the organization of radioelectronic warfare is the poor knowledge staffs have of the radioelectronic systems of the enemy and their vulnerable links. Yet without this knowledge, it is impossible to wage radioelectronic warfare effectively.

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Page 48 of 119 Pages

## 7. IMPROVEMENT OF OPERATIONAL TRAINING

Obviously, I will not be wrong if I say that many bottlenecks in the work of staffs and field headquarters of the fronts, the fleet, and the armies in this exercise are the consequence of defects in the very system of operational training of generals, admirals, and officers. It is in need of improvements for a number of reasons.

First, we are going through a period in which the rapid development of the means of armed combat entails a change also in the methods of conducting a battle and operation.

Second, the complexity of leading troops in operations and the volume and variety of tasks which commanders and staffs must accomplish in the process of troop control have grown.

Third, the natural process of renewal of operational-level military cadres and the coming of young cadres having no experience of the Great Patriotic War into the leadership of formations and staffs seriously confront us with the task of more quickly passing on to them the combat experience of the last war.

In our view, the ways of improving operational training may be the following:

-- improvement of the quality of directing operational training on the part of the commanders and chiefs of staff of operational formations; their personal participation in the conduct of training activities, war games, and exercises; implementation of the principle that every commander prepares and trains his own staff;

-- broadening and perfection of forms and methods of instruction; wider practice of the conduct of exercises on terrain with communications means, of tactical exercises without troops, war games, short operational problems, small-group exercises, and training periods and improvement of the methods of conducting them; working out of most training problems during exercises on a real-time scale, hour for hour, in a complex and fluid situation;

-- wider practice of the conduct of command-staff exercises with the headquarters of operational formations by senior commanders; raising of demands made on command cadres and staffs.

TS #788301

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Page 49 of 119 Pages

VII. THE WORK OF THE GENERAL STAFF OPERATIONS GROUPS  
AND THE UMPIRE ORGANIZATION

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Throughout the entire exercise, the operations groups of the general staffs of the Polish Armed Forces and the Czechoslovak People's Army and of the Main Staff of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic acted simultaneously with the fronts, participated most actively, and successfully accomplished their tasks. In the course of the exercise, they creatively solved many problems of preparation and support of the conduct of combined operations and regroupings of our troops and gave much help in organizing cooperation among the allied troops and in ensuring the instructive conduct of the exercise.

In conclusion, I would like to mention the great amount of useful work performed by the umpire organization in this exercise. It was, after all, their endeavors that produced the complex and fluid situation that enabled us to proficiently work out the training objectives and tasks set in the exercise. To be frank, not everything went smoothly for them, either. There were some mistakes. However, one cannot but agree with the obvious truth that, on the whole, the umpire organization attached to the fronts, the armies, the Combined Baltic Fleet, and to the operations groups of the staffs of the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries handled their tasks successfully in the exercise.

Favorable mention should be made of the work of the umpire group attached to the 2nd Front and headed by First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, General of the Army V. I. PETROV, of the group attached to the 3rd Front and headed by First Deputy Minister of National Defense of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Colonel General V. VALO, and of the group attached to the 4th Front and headed by the commander of the Baltic Military District, Colonel General A. M. MAYOROV.

I would merely direct your attention to the proper relations between trainees and umpires. Unfortunately, there were instances in the exercise when some generals and officers reacted too sensitively and sometimes even incorrectly to the justified remarks of the umpires. Such occurrences must be eliminated in the future. At the same time, the umpires must also be objective in assessing the results of the work of trainees.

TS #788301  
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Page 50 of 119 Pages

In closing my report, I would once more emphasize that all the staffs in the exercise worked with all their energies, with much effort and endeavor to accomplish their tasks in the best possible way, and they had a chance to more thoroughly explore and research a number of important questions of the control of troops and naval forces. This will undoubtedly have great importance for the further improvement of the work of our staffs and of our military theory and practice.

TS #788301  
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Page 51 of 119 Pages

R E P O R T

of the Minister of Defense of the USSR,  
Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. USTINOV

Comrades:

Our operational-strategic command-staff exercise ZAPAD-77 has undoubtedly been necessary and useful. It has made a definite contribution to the accomplishment of the great tasks set by the central committees of our Marxist-Leninist parties to strengthen the defensive capabilities of the socialist commonwealth countries and the combat might of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact.

The practical importance of the exercise consists in the fact that it enabled commanders and staffs to perfect their skills in the planning of operations, in the combat employment of new types of weapons and military equipment, in the organization of regroupings of large masses of troops over great distances, and in the control of troops and naval forces during the preparation and conduct of operations. We have had an opportunity to concretely work out questions of cooperation among allied armies, to test the system of control, to exchange operational training experience, and to explore the possible nature of actions of the NATO armed forces, taking into account the latest changes in their combat strength and in their plans of strategic employment.

The exercise that was conducted required of its participants great efforts, manifestation of broad creative initiative, and daring, well-founded decisions. I agree with the conclusions and remarks which the Chief of Staff of the Directing Body, N. V. OGARKOV, expressed in his report concerning the course of the exercise and the work of commanders and staffs.

In my presentation I would like to dwell on some matters which are of significant importance for the further enhancement of the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of our armed forces.

First of all, the internal and external political conditions which determine our military activity.

TS #788301  
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~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 52 of 119 Pages

I. THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH  
AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Comrades:

As you know, in May there was a Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU at which the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR was discussed.

At the Plenum, a report on "The Draft Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" was presented by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Constitutional Commission, Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV. He dwelt in detail on the reasons that make it necessary to produce a new constitution of the USSR and primarily on those profound changes that have taken place in our country and in the international arena in the four decades since the adoption of the constitution now in effect. In these years, a developed socialist society has been built in the Soviet Union. Major fundamental changes have taken place in all the areas of social life. At the present time, the Soviet people, under the guidance of the Communist Party, are carrying out the historic tasks of building communism.

The international position of the Soviet Union has changed radically. The sociopolitical face of our planet has acquired new features. The capitalist encirclement of the USSR is finished. Socialism has become a worldwide system, and the socialist commonwealth has become more powerful. The position of worldwide capitalism has weakened substantially. Dozens of new states, former colonies, are now coming out against imperialism.

In his report, Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV brought out the main contents of the new constitution, which vividly reflects the most characteristic features of the present stage of our country's development. He particularly stressed that the adoption of the new constitution of the USSR is an event of enormous historical significance not only for the Soviet Union but also for the whole world. It will become an important milestone in the history of our country, one more historical contribution of our Leninist Party, socialist state, and entire Soviet people to the great cause of building communism and, at the same time, to the international cause of the struggle of the workers of all countries for freedom, for human progress, and for solid peace on earth.

The Plenum basically approved the draft constitution and recommended to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR that it be submitted to

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Page 53 of 119 Pages

nationwide discussion. The draft of the new constitution of the USSR and the report of Leonid Ilich BREZHNEV at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU were published in the press, and now the discussion of the draft by the workers of our country is assuming greater and greater scope from day to day. It is also meeting with general approval in the socialist countries and on the part of progressive world opinion.

The members of the Soviet Armed Forces have been actively involved in the discussion of the draft of the new USSR constitution. They eagerly approve the decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU and see it their duty to vigilantly stand guard over the socialist gains of our peoples and still more assiduously improve combat readiness.

\* \* \*

Comrades:

An important factor characterizing the internal situation of the socialist countries is the unswerving strengthening and development of their close cooperation on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, of respect for the equality and sovereignty of every state, and of comradely mutual assistance. The peoples of the socialist countries, guided by the decisions of the congresses of their communist and workers' parties, are achieving more and more new successes in economic and social development, in creating the material-technical base of socialism and communism, in perfecting socialist democracy, and in raising the material and cultural standard of living of the workers. Each socialist country, making maximum use of its own resources and expanding mutual collaboration, makes its contribution to the strengthening of our defensive alliance, the Warsaw Pact.

The unity, solidarity and mutual support of the peoples of our countries and the deepening of brotherly friendship among their Marxist-Leninist parties enable us to combine our knowledge and experience and our economic, spiritual, and defensive resources in the name of the common interests of the whole socialist commonwealth. "Thanks to unity, solidarity, and mutual support," stressed General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Comrade Leonid Ilich BREZHNEV, in the Summary Report to the XXV Party Congress, "the countries of socialism have succeeded in the last five-year period in accomplishing very major tasks, in realizing that for which they have been struggling for a long time."

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Page 54 of 119 Pages

It is indicative that, whereas the industrial production of the capitalist world has grown by a factor of 3.1 in the last 25 years, it has increased elevenfold in the socialist countries. Our countries completed the first year of their new five-year plans with high indices and have made a confident start in the second year.

On the whole, the successes of the fraternal socialist countries in internal matters are evidence of their further strengthening, of the moral and political unity of the peoples, and of their confident striding ahead on the path of socialist progress. All of this promotes the successful fulfilment by the soldiers of our friendly armies of the tasks set before them.

Now, the Soviet people and the peoples of the socialist commonwealth countries are full of enormous work enthusiasm in order to worthily greet the Sixtieth Anniversary of the October Revolution. And the soldiers of our armies are actively involved in this patriotic and international movement. On the basis of further expansion of socialist competition, they are achieving new successes in combat and political training, in maintaining vigilance and constant combat readiness.

The successful accomplishment of the tasks of building socialism and communism in our countries and the strengthening of their solidarity have a decisive effect on the course of international events. The program, put forth by the XXV Congress of the CPSU, of further struggle for peace and international cooperation, for the freedom and independence of peoples, received the unanimous support of the fraternal socialist countries.

Diligently and consistently pursuing a peaceful foreign policy, our countries are doing everything so that peace becomes stable, enduring, and sure. This policy invariably enjoys the recognition and respect of the many millions of people throughout the world. The socialist system has become the most dynamic force on earth and a leading factor in world politics. The international weight and authority of the countries of socialism and their influence on the course of world events are growing and becoming ever stronger and more profound. The relaxation of tension and a course toward the peaceful coexistence of states with different sociopolitical structures have become the leading trend of modern social development.

"Time," as Comrade Erich HONECKER said when bestowing the highest award of the German Democratic Republic on Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV, "convincingly testifies that we are on the right path...that the trend

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Page 55 of 119 Pages

toward further relaxation of international tension is becoming the main direction of the foreign policy actions of many countries of the world."

The chief problem of our time is the prevention of war and the curbing of the arms race. Solution of this problem will bring about favorable conditions for the strengthening of socialism and the development of the worldwide revolutionary process.

However, even under the conditions of detente, reactionary imperialist circles are intensifying the arms race, continuing material preparation of war, and organizing ideological sabotage. Their efforts are directed primarily toward weakening the socialist association and driving a wedge between our countries. "Every day," as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Comrade Gustav HUSAK said at the conference of the communist and workers' parties of Europe, "we are witnesses of what considerable efforts our class enemy is undertaking to weaken us, isolate the parties from one another, and splinter our forces in order to fragment and obliterate the common basis of our class interests and goals."

Of considerable effect on the state of the general international situation are Soviet-American relations.

Thanks to the vigorous and purposeful policy of the Soviet state, our mutual relations with the USA have acquired a solid basis in the form of the important treaties and agreements concluded in 1972-1974 on cooperation in different areas. This has greatly promoted an improvement of the international climate.

However, influential circles in the military-industrial complex of the USA are making persistent efforts to retard the further improvement of Soviet-American relations. They are trying to exert pressure on our country, interfere with the domestic policies of the Soviet state, and deal with us from a "position of strength" on the calculation that they will manage to get unilateral political, economic, and military advantages for themselves. This was the spirit in which the Americans spoke in March 1977 at the strategic arms limitation talks in Moscow. This same line is being taken by the Western countries also at the talks in Vienna on the reduction of the armed forces and arms in Central Europe.

TS #788301

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Page 56 of 119 Pages

Such attempts have received and will receive due rebuff on our part. "Our sovereign rights, our dignity, and our interests," Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV has said, "always have been and always will be firmly upheld by the Soviet Union." We have never relinquished the security of our country or the security of our allies and we never will.

The situation in Europe. The preservation of peace on earth largely depends on how relations among the European states develop. In Europe, changes in the direction of relaxing tension and strengthening international security are especially perceptible. This results primarily from the strengthening of the position of socialism and from the effect of the coordinated policies of our countries. Playing a positive role in this is the Concluding Statement, signed in Helsinki, of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Assessing its significance in a speech at the XVI Congress of Labor Unions of the USSR, Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV noted that "the peace in Europe has become stronger, and the economic, cultural, and other ties and contacts between countries noticeably broader and richer."

It must be said that the provisions of the Concluding Statement are not, by any means, being implemented equally by the socialist and capitalist countries. Whereas the socialist countries of Europe are adhering strictly to its spirit and letter, in the capitalist world the positive points are entangled with the negative ones, with the latter often coming out on top. Some states, especially the members of NATO, are attempting to exploit this agreement in order to discredit the domestic and foreign policies of the socialist countries, or they try to confine the process of detente to the framework of humanitarian problems.

The main role in all this is being played by American imperialism. Exploiting its influence in Europe, it is trying to force its NATO allies to continue a "position of strength" policy, to consolidate this aggressive bloc, to increase its military-strategic and especially its nuclear potential, and to draw new members -- Spain in particular -- into it, as well as to get its Western European partners to increase military appropriations and further militarize their economies and policies.

NATO has recently been attempting to extend its sphere of influence to other regions, primarily the Near East and the zones of the Persian Gulf, the South Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean, in order to ensure safe access to sources of strategic raw materials. All these actions are causing an increase of international tension and threat of war.

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Page 57 of 119 Pages

The antisocialist policy of the NATO states in Europe enjoys full support of the Peking leaders, who advocate the consolidation of this bloc and the retention of American troops on the European continent. The new leadership of China has taken the militarist baton of MAO Tse-tung and continues day by day to intensify the anti-Soviet slander campaign, which is assuming wider and wider scope. It is trying to exacerbate Soviet-Chinese relations and the whole international situation and to discredit the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries.

Certainly, we would like to have normal good-neighborly relations with China, and we have stated this repeatedly. However, we meet no positive steps in this direction on the part of the Chinese leadership.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have come out and are coming out for practical actions leading to a strengthening of security on the European continent, to a limitation, and then to a cessation of the arms race. In the declaration of the Warsaw Pact member states adopted at the last meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, they proposed to all the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that they take upon themselves the obligation not to use nuclear weapons against one another first and not to increase the number of members of the Warsaw Pact or NATO. We introduced a number of proposals opening a real path toward achieving an agreement on the reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe. However, the imperialist circles torpedo the proposals of the socialist states on the calculation that they will manage to get unilateral concessions from us on fundamental issues.

Such tactics are withstood by the firm and consistent line of the socialist commonwealth countries to resolve the questions of security and cooperation in Europe on the principles of equality and equal security so that neither of the sides can acquire any advantages at the expense of the other.

"The future of Europe belongs to peaceable forces," said First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Comrade Edward GIEREK, at the VII Congress of his party. "The peoples of our continent do not want a return to the times of hostility, conflicts, and wars. This requires constant vigilance and implacability in relation to the reactionary and militarist forces."

Under the conditions that have developed, wherein the NATO bloc is continually strengthening itself, our countries must continue to strengthen

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Page 58 of 119 Pages

the Warsaw Pact Organization. The creation and consolidation of the socialist defensive alliance we regard as a result of the great gains of our fraternal peoples and of our Marxist-Leninist parties, as a new triumph of Lenin's teaching on the defense of the socialist homeland, as a major step in its further development. And to strengthen this alliance is our sacred duty.

This was also spoken of in the Communiqué of the Bucharest Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Member States. "As long as the NATO bloc continues to exist and build up its military potential," the communiqué says, "the Warsaw Pact member states will take all the necessary steps within the framework of the Pact in order to continually guarantee our peoples reliable security."

Such, in general outline, are the external political conditions under which the combat training of our armies is proceeding this year. Our parties and states are making persistent efforts to turn detente into an irreversible process. Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV's visits to France and the Federal Republic of Germany are about to take place, and we hope that they will promote a further softening of the political climate in Europe.

However, we must show great vigilance, be always ready for unexpected turns in the development of events in Europe and other areas of the world, maintain the armed forces in constant combat readiness, improve their technical equipping, perfect their operational, combat, and political training, and strengthen in every way possible the combat alliance, friendship, and collaboration of our armies.

## II. POSSIBLE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OF THE SIDES IN THE WESTERN THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Comrades:

The Western Theater of Military Operations always has been and continues to be the most crucial for us from both the political and the military-strategic standpoint. Here the interests of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are closely interwoven and the contradictions between them most sharply manifested. In this theater is concentrated around 30 percent of the industrial production of the capitalist countries, and large reserves of weapons, including nuclear weapons, and other materiel-technical means are kept there. Here powerful military groupings

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Page 59 of 119 Pages

of countries belonging to different social systems oppose each other.

Great efforts are being made in the aggressive NATO bloc to build up its military might and achieve superiority over the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. To this end, the combat strength of the armed forces is being increased, their provision with new weapons and combat equipment is proceeding at a rapid rate, the intensity of exercises is growing, the preparation of theaters of military operations is being improved, and work is being carried out to increase the mobilization readiness of the war industry. In the last five years, merely through the modernization of armament and provision of the armed forces with new combat equipment and weapons, the military potential of NATO has increased 15 to 20 percent.

Enormous resources are being allocated for the expansion of military preparations. For the current five-year period (1976-1980), the NATO countries have planned to increase these resources by 60 percent in comparison with the preceding five-year period and bring them up to one trillion dollars. Expenditures for arms procurement are being increased by a factor of more than 1.6. Research and development projects are being carried out on a wide front, and over 105 billion dollars is being allocated for them.

The main efforts of NATO are directed toward achieving military-technical superiority over the Warsaw Pact countries by producing fundamentally new weapons systems and putting them into service. Special attention is being devoted here to development of the most destructive means, of new types of biological, laser, and acceleration [uskoritelnoye - higher performance?] weapons, and of means and methods of waging geophysical war.

At the May session of the NATO Council, in which heads of state and heads of government took part, the pivotal question, as always, was the arms buildup. The tone at the session was set by the American president. Citing the mythical "Soviet military threat," he persistently advocated further strengthening NATO politically, economically, and militarily.

As a result of this, it was decided to increase expenditures for military purposes by three percent annually and embark on an "urgent program" of strengthening the military might of NATO.

At the present time, the number of NATO armed forces in Europe is over 2.5 million men. Here are concentrated [80] divisions and 62 separate brigades, around 13,000 tanks, over 18,000 guns, 3,700 aircraft, and over

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Page 60 of 119 Pages

8,000 nuclear warheads. The NATO countries openly declare that the combat might of their troops will grow even further through rearmament with new models of military equipment. In the next decade, they intend to double the number of antitank means and raise the number of aircraft by half; the number of tank divisions is planned to be doubled.

In objectively assessing the strategic capabilities of the NATO countries, it should be taken into account that they possess considerable military potential. Their strong points are the availability of powerful nuclear means and numerous tactical aircraft and the fact that the ground forces are provided with a large amount of various kinds of armored, self-propelled, and antitank equipment, with new salvo fire systems, and with combat helicopters. ✓

This does not mean that NATO has no vulnerable points. Among these one may include, for instance, the presence of serious contradictions between certain countries of the bloc, the difference and diversity of the armies in levels of combat preparedness, the political dissimilarity of the personnel, and the lack of ideological unity. It is likewise well to note the relatively small depth of the western portion of the theater of military operations (500 to 800 kilometers), the vastness and vulnerability of the sea lanes, the poor protection of strategic flanks, and other things.

The strategy of the enemy has a clear-cut aggressive orientation. In drawing up its military plans, the NATO leadership puts into service the entire arsenal of strategic techniques developed by the imperialists in the course of many predatory wars. Underlying these is reliance on surprise and on total methods of waging war.

We cannot fail to take all of this into account when working out our military-strategic concepts. These are based on the Leninist peaceful foreign policy and on readiness to deal a decisive rebuff to any aggressor. Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV has mentioned more than once in his appearances that the Soviet Union threatens no one and intends to attack no one, but it has always maintained and will in the future maintain its defensive capability and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces on a high level. And all the other Warsaw Pact member states adhere to the same line.

And if we are today engaged in a practical working out of the questions of preparing and conducting a strategic operation in the Western Theater of Military Operations, we are forced to this by the presence of a military threat, by the increase in military preparations of the

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Page 61 of 119 Pages

imperialist NATO states, and by the need to guarantee the security of the socialist commonwealth countries.

On the political plane, the Warsaw Pact member states are taking all steps in order to prevent an outbreak of war in Europe. As for the area of military strategy, our communist and workers' parties see it their main task to pursue a coordinated military policy, to improve the armed forces of the fraternal socialist states, to provide them with all modern types of weapons and combat equipment, and to maintain them in such a state that in every respect they not only match the probable enemy but even surpass him and are in constant readiness to ward off aggression and conduct highly vigorous actions with the use of both conventional and nuclear weapons.

A decisive condition of our achievement of victory in a war against the strong grouping of capitalist states is unity of the military strategy of the Warsaw Pact member states. Its main characteristic features may be summed up as follows.

First and chief is to ensure the inviolability of the western borders of the socialist commonwealth countries, for which it is very important to maintain the troops and navies constantly at a high level of combat readiness. This requirement is due to the fact that the limited dimensions of the theater, the proximity of the major political-administrative and industrial centers to the borders, and also the disposition of enemy troops in ready groupings drastically limit the time which our armed forces may have available to prepare for actions. Hence the time factor and the high combat readiness of our armed forces are of decisive importance.

Second, in case of a military attack on the socialist commonwealth countries, our armed forces must seize and firmly hold the strategic initiative in their hands. This means that the troops of the first \* operational echelon, aviation, and the fleet must be capable of independently, before the arrival of reserves from the interior, warding off an enemy invasion and inflicting severe damage on his main groupings.

Third, we must be ready, in case of necessity, after repelling the military attack of the enemy, to boldly and decisively carry military actions over to his territory and, through powerful attacks of the ground forces, aviation, and fleet during these actions, to inflict the necessary losses in men and combat equipment on the enemy and maximally weaken his aviation and missile/nuclear groupings before the commencement of the use of nuclear weapons. This requires ensuring a more mobile strategic efforts ✓ buildup than the enemy's through the movement forward and commitment to the

TS #788301  
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Page 62 of 119 Pages

engagement of second-echelon fronts, through the use of airborne and amphibious landing forces, and through the conduct of air and air defense operations.

We must apply the enumerated requirements of our strategy with due regard for the general principles of military art and, above all, such principles as concentration of troop and naval efforts at the decisive moment on the main axis, achievement of success in a battle and operation through the joint efforts of all branches of the armed forces and branch arms on a basis of their close cooperation, comprehensive combat and materiel-technical support of troops and naval forces from the beginning to the end of the operations, and flexible and reliable control of troops.

The concept of the exercise was based on all these requirements of our strategy, and we endeavored to adhere to them and work them out in keeping with the developing situation.

### III. MAIN PROBLEMS OF THE EXERCISE

In the exercise, problems were worked out in three main stages which reflected the situation prior to the inception and during the first eight to ten days of a war. They embodied all the distinctiveness and complexity of military actions in the West: large strategic scale of the first operations and of the regroupings of large masses of troops with a vast amount of military equipment; simultaneous envelopment through vigorous combat actions of enormous territories not only of the border zone but also of the deep rear, air and space, and water areas; highly fluid development of events with drastic changes in the situation; frequent occurrence of crisis situations; intense struggle for the strategic initiative; and constant threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

These conditions require of commanders and staffs a profound knowledge of the nature of modern war, the ability to employ large masses of troops with due regard for their purpose and combat capabilities, and good creative and organizational abilities. Success in a modern war will go to the side on which strategic predictions are more farsighted, plans more realistic and well-founded, and calculations more precise, to him who shows more initiative in engagements and imposes his will on the enemy.

In this exercise we had the opportunity to test the efficacy of the methods we had worked out for training commanders and staffs, employing

TS #788301

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Page 63 of 119 Pages

forces and means in combat, controlling troops, and organizing cooperation.

In the first stage of the exercise, it was necessary to plan the bringing of troops to full combat readiness and carry it out practically in a limited time, to adopt decisions for repelling the enemy attack, and to establish the necessary groupings of forces and means. It was further necessary to carry out the full mobilization of the second operational echelons and reserves and the movement of these up to the theater of military operations, to complete the operational deployment of aviation and the fleet, and to put the wartime control system into operation.

On the whole, commanders and staffs handled this work well. Their plans for repelling aggression and conducting the first operations arouse no special objections. However, I would direct attention to the display of a certain lack of confidence in the combat capabilities of troops. For instance, the 2nd Front had at its disposal such forces and means as to enable it not only to "hold out at whatever cost until the approach of operational reserves from the interior," as it was expressed during the reporting of the decision, but also to deliver powerful retaliatory attacks on the hostile groupings, cause them heavy losses, and ultimately thwart the aggressive intentions of the enemy. Moreover, given a favorable situation, the front troops on selected axes could go over to a decisive offensive and carry combat actions over to the territory of the enemy. It is in this that we see the main point of repelling aggression, and not merely in defensive actions in expectation of the approach of additional forces and means from the interior. And defense itself must be waged actively, with full application of the available forces and means.

The commanders of the 2nd Front (General of the Army Ye. F. IVANOVSKIY) and the 3rd Front (Colonel General Frantisek VESELY) somewhat underestimated the importance of the Berlin and Prague axes in West's aggressive plans. In spite of the fact that the main efforts of the fronts were concentrated on these axes, the troops and combat means allocated here to repel the enemy offensive were still inadequate. The balance of forces that developed on the Berlin and Prague axes did not ensure the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to the fronts, and, as subsequent events confirmed, the enemy had the greatest penetration into East's defense on these axes.

Of decisive importance for the successful conduct of a strategic operation in the Western Theater of Military Operations is the timely movement of operational reserves forward from the interior and their organized commitment to the engagement to build up the efforts of the first echelon. We have accumulated no little experience in carrying out

TS #788301  
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Page 64 of 119 Pages

regroupings of troops. In the Great Patriotic War, not one front operation, to say nothing of the operations of groups of fronts, took place without major regroupings. In a future war, too, they will be employed most extensively and their scale will grow still larger. But, whereas in the last war regroupings usually went on without strong opposition on the part of the enemy, under modern conditions, especially in the Western Theater, the enemy will not let us calmly maneuver troops; he will oppose this with all forces and means.

Therefore, the movement of troops up to the front line requires precise organization, comprehensive combat and materiel-technical support, and reliable, uninterrupted control of troops. Everything must be directed toward carrying out the movement of troops quickly, covertly, and with their retention of high combat readiness for commitment to the engagement.

According to the situation created for the exercise, in the body of troops moving forward there were three front formations consisting of several dozen tank and motorized rifle divisions, aviation, artillery, and combat, rear services, and technical support forces and means. This entire mass of troops was moving simultaneously, essentially filling all the space from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathian Mountains. Commanders and staffs were faced with a vital task -- ensuring the timely movement of these troops and committing them to the engagement in an organized fashion. To fulfil this task required carrying out an enormous number of measures, especially on matters of support, performance of which was possible only through the combined efforts of the allied states and their armies.

I want to stress the special importance of ensuring the secrecy of regroupings being carried out in a period of threat. Of course, given modern means of reconnaissance, it is hard to conceal mass movements of troops entirely, and yet commanders and staffs must show special concern for operational camouflage. It is necessary, through the conduct of feints and diversionary actions, to deceive the enemy and mislead him concerning the true concentration areas of the troops and the axes of their main efforts.

I must say that the commanders and staffs of all the fronts properly understand the importance and complexity of regroupings and show great responsibility for carrying them out. We have no special comments on the decisions for the regrouping of troops adopted by the commanders of the 1st Front (General of Arms Eugeniusz MOLCZYK), the 4th Front (Colonel General of Tank Troops M. M. ZAYTSEV), and the 5th Front (Colonel General V. I. VARENNIKOV). All of them, on the whole, adopted correct decisions after

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substantiating them with the appropriate operational calculations.

However, I would mention individual shortcomings in the decisions adopted. First of all, I must direct attention to the necessity of organizing combat with enemy sabotage-and-reconnaissance groups, which may be dropped in large numbers at the beginning of a war. Underrating combat with these may lead to the movement of troops and control of them being seriously disrupted, as happened with the 5th Front, where, as a result of the actions of enemy sabotage-and-reconnaissance groups and enemy air and missile strikes, fuel reserves were wiped out and bridges and sections of the roads in passes were destroyed, as a consequence of which the troops of the front got to the concentration areas over two days late.

I must also mention certain other oversights in the commanders' decisions on regrouping. Thus, in the 4th and 5th Fronts, the cover of airfields and troops by air defense means was not organized effectively enough, and the first-priority movement of the ground echelons of the air armies to the new basing areas was not supported. Due importance was not given to radioelectronic warfare or more precise organization and maintenance of cooperation, especially for the period of movement of troops over the territory of the Polish People's Republic. All these and certain other shortcomings in a real situation may lead to serious disruptions of the regrouping plans worked out and create great difficulties in controlling troops on the march. Therefore, everything must be carefully thought out, organized, and seen to.

The content of the second stage of the exercise was repelling the invasion of large enemy groupings and committing the second-echelon fronts to the engagement.

Success in repelling an attack of superior enemy forces depends first of all on the ability of troops to quickly establish a strong, deeply echeloned defense and carry on vigorous, decisive actions. It is necessary, through powerful fire strikes growing in intensity, as well as through decisive counterattacks and counterthrusts in a short period of time, to force the enemy to abandon a further offensive, to wear out his forces, to defeat tank groupings that have broken through, to annihilate airborne forces and airmobile troops that have landed, and thereby achieve a quick, decisive break in the situation and bring about advantageous conditions for subsequently going over to a decisive counteroffensive. At the same time, the operational reserves should be drawn forward and prepared for commitment to the engagement in order to build up the efforts of the first echelon.

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The decisions of the front and army commanders for repelling the enemy invasion were correct on the whole. However, the endeavor of certain commanders and staffs to base all calculations for achieving successful accomplishment of this task on the expectation of using nuclear weapons draws attention to itself. Such a one-sided approach ignoring the growing combat capabilities of conventional weapons is hardly justified. It is necessary from the very outset of combat actions to bring their full power to bear on the enemy and inflict decisive damage on him. Such use of conventional weapons is all the more important since their development has undergone many innovations in recent years: there have appeared volume-burst munitions, bombs and projectiles with laser guidance systems, means of remote control mining of the terrain, combat helicopters with onboard weapons, and other armament. The task consists in learning to skilfully and fully exploit their powerful striking and fire capabilities in battle.

One more question came up during the exercise. We have in service such a powerful long-range means of destruction as operational-tactical and tactical missiles with conventional explosives. Before going over to the use of nuclear weapons, these were simply not taken into account in our plans. Obviously, we should think about developing more effective cluster and special warheads for these and fully exploit them under the conditions of conducting combat actions before nuclear weapons are used.

In some fronts and armies, insufficient attention was paid to combating the antitank means of the enemy. And this is the sort of problem on whose solution the actions not only of tank, but also of motorized rifle units and large units and the success of an operation as a whole will depend to a considerable extent.

We know that the enemy is constantly improving his antitank means, developing new ones, and increasing their number. Thus, a US mechanized division now already has 417 items of various antitank weapons, including 270 antitank guided missiles. Among NATO troops there are provisions for establishing a deeply echeloned antitank defense with a density of as many as 50 to 80 antitank items per kilometer of frontage on the main axes. If these means are not neutralized, great tank losses are inevitable. In the Arab-Israeli war, for example, in a total of 19 days the sides lost nearly 3,100 tanks, or about 50 percent of all the tanks participating in combat actions, to antitank means.

Artillery and fire support helicopters must be fully exploited for combating antitank means. Front aviation may also assume a definite share

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of the tasks. The antitank means remaining after artillery and aviation have softened up the enemy defense must be destroyed by all the fire means which the attacking troops have at their disposal.

Special attention must be paid to combating helicopters armed with antitank guided missiles. These are new, highly effective means capable of destroying tanks and infantry combat vehicles while located at a considerable distance from them. To disrupt control of the antitank guided missiles of the enemy, it is necessary to employ radioelectronic means more extensively and find new methods of combating them.

Playing a large role in building up operational efforts and achieving high rates of advance is the landing of airborne and amphibious landing forces. In our exercise, besides helicopter landings, the drop of three airborne forces and the debarkation of an amphibious landing force were worked out. The actions of the airborne forces were planned correctly on the whole. As for the amphibious landing operation, there were substantial shortcomings in its organization and conduct.

The main measures to organize the landing were not thought out and planned thoroughly enough. A joint command was not created for the amphibious and airborne landing operations to take the island of Zealand, nor were the proper means allocated to support the landing of the forces. Cooperation of the units and large units of the different branches of the armed forces taking part in the operation was poorly organized.

From a theoretical point of view, there is nothing unclear about the preparation and conduct of an amphibious landing operation. Our regulations give exhaustive recommendations on this question. But as far as the practical work of commanders and staffs to organize this operation and control troops in it is concerned, there are no few unresolved questions that require serious work.

One of the most complex and crucial stages of a strategic operation is going over to a counteroffensive in order to defeat the attack groupings of the enemy and take the strategic initiative.

A counteroffensive must be powerful and stunning to the enemy. As the experience of the Great Patriotic War showed, it achieves its purpose in those instances when it is carefully prepared and carried out on several axes so as to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to maneuver forces and means, and to contain his actions.

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Page 68 of 119 Pages

Vigorous actions must simultaneously envelop the entire operational depth of the enemy disposition in order to cut off the movement forward and deployment of his reserves and prevent the formation of a stable defensive front in the depth.

As a result of the timely counterattacks of the second echelons of divisions and counterthrusts of the second echelons of corps, armies, and fronts, East managed initially to restore the balance and then, going over to a counteroffensive, to inflict serious damage on the enemy and penetrate 100 to 150 kilometers into his territory in places.

West has in fact used all its operational reserves and, finding itself in a very difficult position, adopts the decision to employ nuclear weapons. This began the third stage of our exercise.

West's initiative in the use of nuclear weapons imposed a special responsibility on East's commanders, staffs, and all of its control organs. Not a minute's time could be lost in organizing and implementing retaliatory measures.

Commanders and staffs had to detect in time the enemy measures to prepare and deliver nuclear strikes, take steps to protect the troops from them, ensure the necessary dispersal of personnel and combat equipment, organize reliable warning of the nuclear threat, and prepare their forces and means to deliver the initial nuclear strikes against the enemy.

The use of nuclear weapons must be preceded by intensive final reconnaissance of targets and refinement of tasks for the means allocated to hit them. Failure to observe this requirement may lead to delivery of strikes on a deserted site. During the exercise, commanders and staffs paid great attention to this matter, and final reconnaissance of targets was carried out by them mainly on time.

An exceptionally crucial point is determination of the time of delivering the initial nuclear strike. Here everything is important: undelayed adoption and refinement of decisions and transmission of instructions to the troops, speedy and coordinated work of the personnel of missile/nuclear and air large units and units, accurate performance of assigned tasks, precise control of combat actions, and rapid collection and processing of information about the delivery of nuclear strikes against the enemy and about one's own troop losses.

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Page 69 of 119 Pages

The exercise showed that we are still unable in staffs to work with such precision and speed as this crucial period requires. In some staffs we observed too much fuss and disorganization, which interfered with their performance of their tasks.

For now, it is hard to say how events will develop after the sides have exchanged massed missile/nuclear strikes. However, we all picture a very complex situation arising. Many troops will sustain very considerable losses; communications will be disrupted; zones of destruction, flooding, and radioactive contamination of the terrain will be formed over enormous territories; and massive fires will break out. It is not out of the question that an operational pause will occur after the initial most powerful and destructive nuclear strike.

Nevertheless, under these exceptionally complex conditions one must find the will and show good organizational abilities, courage, and self-control to firmly keep control of troops in his own hands and determine the further method of actions. It is necessary, no matter what happens, to preempt the enemy in restoring the combat effectiveness of units, ships, and large units and in developing vigorous actions on the most important axes.

#### IV. ACTIONS OF THE BRANCHES OF THE ARMED FORCES

One of the most important conditions for achieving success in operations is the proper use of the large units and formations of the different branches of the armed forces, and the flexible and precise coordination of their efforts to accomplish the assigned tasks.

In this connection, let me dwell briefly on the combat employment of the branches of the armed forces in a strategic operation. \*

#### ACTIONS OF THE AIR FORCES

The combat capabilities of modern aviation, like those of all the other branches of the armed forces, are constantly increasing, and they must be exploited intelligently. The success of an operation is unthinkable without this. Having powerful bombs, missiles, and other armament with high hit accuracy, aviation is capable of inflicting great

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losses on the enemy and simultaneously covering one's own troops and naval forces against strikes from the air, thereby having a real effect on the achievement of success in the operation.

Particularly acute is the matter of the struggle for air supremacy. The main form of this struggle is the conduct of an air operation. Called on for participation in this operation are long range aviation, the air armies of the fronts, and large units of the other branches of the armed forces.

The opinion exists among some commanders that front aviation should not be totally allocated for the conduct of an air operation, since this limits its capabilities for close support of the troops on the battlefield. To be sure, when allocating front aviation for participation in an air operation, one must in the first place take into account the interests of the ground forces. As I see it, the increase of the combat strength of the Air Forces, the growth of their combat capabilities, and the creation of army aviation ensure the performance of tasks both to support the ground forces and to conduct an air operation.

The exercise showed that, in the Western Theater of Military Operations, during the rebasing of air armies from the border military districts of the Soviet Union there arise definite difficulties in providing them with airfields for dispersed basing and for the maneuvering of air units. The bunching of aviation in the frontline zone increases the probability of losses of aircraft on the ground from the strikes of enemy aviation and missile means.

All of this urgently necessitates further development of the network of airfields with concrete landing strips in the east of the German Democratic Republic, the west of the Polish People's Republic, and the central part of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

A few remarks about the actions of aviation in our exercise.

Attention should be paid to more flexible planning of an air operation. It cannot be considered correct that an air operation is worked out according to one variant, without taking into account the actions of the air enemy, the condition of one's own aviation, and the weather conditions. We were convinced of this by the example of the 2nd Front. Its command did not take into account the take-off of the enemy aircraft, and no changes were made in the original plans of action of the air army. Clearly, in such a situation some of the strikes of the air army

TS #788301  
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Page 71 of 119 Pages

took place against vacant enemy airfields.

One must always have alternate variants of the actions of aviation that provide for retargeting part of the forces of the air army against other targets or for moving the start of the air operation to a more advantageous time in order to catch the enemy aircraft on the airfields.

Particularly acute in the Western Theater is the problem of negotiating the air defense system of the enemy. He has created here a strong, deeply echeloned air defense based on integrated use of surface-to-air guided missiles, fighter aviation, and tactical antiaircraft means.

In order to negotiate such an air defense system, one must know its strong and weak points, skilfully take them into account, and, in breaking through, make extensive use of various tactical methods not expected by the enemy, select optimum altitudes, maneuver flexibly, and destroy the enemy's surface-to-air missile means, airfields, and control posts quickly and accurately. It is necessary to more extensively call on the tactical and operational-tactical missiles of the Ground Forces with conventional charges and cluster warheads to hit air defense targets. At the same time, it is necessary to also find other effective technical ways of solving this problem.

Modern air armies are an enormous force, and front commanders must fully exploit this force in the interests of achieving the objectives of an operation. Thought should also be given to improving the control of aviation at the front level.

#### ACTIONS OF THE AIR DEFENSE FORCES OF THE COUNTRY

The enemy, too, assigns aviation an important role in the achievement of success in a war. The importance of our air defense grows in connection with this.

In the Western Theater of Military Operations, we have no small number of air defense forces and means. It is important to learn to use them with due effectiveness. It is perfectly obvious that it is an extraordinarily complex task to prevent an air enemy from breaking through to the troops and installations being covered in the west; nevertheless, it is necessary to accomplish it diligently.

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Page 72 of 115 pages

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This can be achieved on the condition that the efforts of all the air defense forces and means of the allied armies in the theater of military operations and of the fighter aviation of the fronts are combined, that tasks are rationally allocated among them, and that their actions are precisely coordinated. We cannot yet say that we have fully resolved these questions in keeping with modern requirements. It is necessary to ponder well what else should be done from an organizational, operational, and technical standpoint to successfully resolve them.

Based on the outlook for the development of air attack means, we should continue work to build up the combat capabilities of air defense means, improve the existing surface-to-air missile systems and develop new ones, and introduce automated control systems.

As far as the combat employment of air defense forces in our exercise is concerned, I would direct the attention of the commander of the 5th Separate Air Defense Army, General-Leytenant A. I. KUZMENKO, and the commander of the 14th Separate Air Defense Army, Colonel General of Aviation V. D. LAVRINENKOV, to the unwieldiness of their decisions and orders and I would like them to thoroughly improve methods of assessing the air enemy and their own forces and means and to take fuller account of the qualitative characteristics of armament in balance of forces calculations. More attention should also be paid to the organization of cooperation with the fighter aviation of the air armies of fronts and with the field air defense means, which are the forward echelon of the air defense of our countries on the western axis. \* ✓

#### ACTIONS OF THE NAVY

A large volume of tasks to be performed confronted the Combined Baltic Fleet (fleet commander, Vice Admiral A. M. KOSOV). Its actions in naval operations will largely be determined by the conditions of enemy opposition in the Baltic, in the straits zone, and in the North Sea. The NATO countries, having a large number of submarines, surface ships, and aircraft at their disposal, will endeavor through vigorous actions not only to contain the Combined Baltic Fleet but also to inflict considerable losses on it.

The main tasks of the Combined Baltic Fleet under these conditions \* consist in gaining supremacy on the Baltic Sea at the very beginning of a \* war, providing effective coverage of the flanks of the coastal front \*

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Page 75 of 119 Pages

against enemy strikes from the sea, assisting our troops in taking the straits zone, and carrying on vigorous activity of the fleet forces to destroy strike groupings and disrupt enemy sea traffic in the North Sea.

To gain supremacy on the Baltic Sea, the fleet must destroy the main strike groupings of the enemy fleet, disrupt his basing and control system, prevent the entry of new forces into the Baltic Sea, and ensure safety of operation for its own ships.

The commander of the Combined Baltic Fleet basically assessed the operational-strategic situation and the fleet's role and place in the strategic operation in the theater correctly. On the whole, his decision, in which the main efforts of the fleet were concentrated from the start of combat actions on gaining and holding supremacy on the Baltic Sea, corresponded to the assigned tasks.

At the same time, during the planning and conduct of an operation, more attention should be paid to reliable air cover of the Combined Baltic Fleet. Gaining air supremacy in the continental portion of the Western Theater must without fail be extended also to the waters of the Baltic Sea. This task must be accomplished through the common efforts of the large units and formations of the air forces, air defense forces, and naval forces of the allied countries on the basis of their close cooperation, with extensive use of long-range surface-to-air missile systems, shipboard air defense weapons, fighter aviation, and means of radioelectronic warfare.

It is necessary to resolutely carry on combat with enemy submarines, achieving their annihilation and subsequently also prevention of the entry of new forces into the Baltic Sea through the straits. To increase the effectiveness of combat with them requires the coordinated actions of the antisubmarine forces of the allied navies, the organization and use of antisubmarine lines in the zone approaching the straits, and also the development of special measures to disrupt the enemy submarine control system.

Finally, it is very important to ensure antimine safety of the actions of our fleet. In the exercise, provisions were made for extensive use of mine ordnance by the sides. In just the first days of combat actions, plans called for setting out over 16 thousand mines. This would create a complex situation at sea, increase the threat of demolition of our ships and vessels by mines, and require the conduct of extensive measures to combat the mine hazard.

TS #788301  
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~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 74 of 119 Pages

In order to provide effective antimine defense, it is necessary for seamen to improve the existing forces and means of combating mines and to develop and find new ones, utilizing the achievements of science and technology for this.

#### ACTIONS OF CIVIL DEFENSE

In a modern war, the actions of civil defense acquire important state-wide significance. Without well-organized civil defense, the normal functioning of the national economy of a country in wartime is impossible. This is why our parties and governments are paying a great deal of attention to civil defense.

Worked out in the exercise against the background of the operational-strategic situation created were questions of the conversion of civil defense from peace to war status, protection of the population, organization of the control of civil defense forces and means, and conduct of rescue and urgent emergency restoration operations in centers of destruction.

Special attention was devoted to questions of the cooperation of civil defense organs and the military command. This enabled the joint accomplishment of tasks by the armed forces and civil defense to be looked into more thoroughly.

The exercise showed that the civil defense organs are adequately prepared on the whole for actions under the complex conditions of war. At the same time, there is need for further improvement of the methods of protecting the population and of increasing the stability of the control system.

An important question is the coordination of the population dispersal plans with the plans for regroupings of the allied troops and for the organization of cooperation of the civil defense organs of the border oblasts of the Warsaw Pact countries among themselves and with the troops, especially in respect to mutual notification of nuclear strikes and reporting on the radiation and chemical situation, dangers of flooding, and other things.

The joint actions of military districts and civil defense organs to eliminate the aftereffects of enemy missile and air strikes and to combat

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Page 75 of 119 Pages

sabotage detachments were inadequately worked out. Timely mutual reporting on these matters was not arranged, as a result of which the command of the military districts in several cases was unable to give effective assistance to the civil defense organs. The experience of the joint actions of the military districts and the civil defense organs obtained during the exercise should be studied more thoroughly and incorporated into the practice of operational training.

V. SOME MATTERS OF TROOP CONTROL AND OF COMBAT AND  
MATERIEL-TECHNICAL SUPPORT

TROOP CONTROL

Troop control has always played an important role in the achievement of victory. At the present time, its importance as a primary factor of the combat readiness of the armed forces, as one of the decisive conditions of success in a battle and operation, has become even greater. One may have the most sophisticated weapons and well-trained personnel, but if control of the troops is lost, their combat capabilities remain unutilized and the fulfilment of tasks will be threatened. The experience of all wars shows that troop control is the most vulnerable spot in the actions of units, large units, and formations and disruption of it for even a short time is intolerable. Moreover, the higher the command level, the more serious harm the loss or disruption of control entails and the more difficult it is to restore it. \* \* \*

We all recall the Great Patriotic War. It began in an extremely unfavorable situation for us. And the first thing we encountered then was a serious disruption of troop control. A great deal of effort had to be applied to right the situation.

The troop control system has also proven to be the most vulnerable spot in a number of modern local wars. In the Arab-Israeli wars, for example, poor organization of control proved to be one of the reasons for many Arab failures. \*

The troop control system to be developed in peacetime must be exceptionally flexible, mobile, and stable. It is quite possible that with the start of military actions there will be occasion to make corrections in the operations plan worked out earlier, refine combat tasks for the troops,

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restore the cooperation and combat effectiveness of troops and naval forces subjected to massed fire strikes by the enemy, and adjust the system of rear services and technical support. Therefore, it is very important that all this complex and difficult work proceed purposefully and energetically, that it instill in subordinates confidence of success and mobilize them to accomplish the combat tasks, that is, that the troops constantly sense firm control over them.

In the exercise, we became familiar with the control methods of many command and staff levels of our armies. The materials obtained in the course of the exercise must be well analyzed and comprehended, and everything new that is useful for improving our control organs must be taken into account and incorporated into the practice of combat and operational training.

The reliability of our control system will increase only if it comes to be based on a common technical foundation, on integrated use of both stationary command posts and communications centers, and field mobile and airborne command posts and command ships.

The general line in solving the problems of troop control must be automation of all the processes of collecting and processing information, working out decisions, and transmitting instructions to any control level in the very shortest time periods. Simultaneously with this, the mobility of command posts must be increased by reducing the number of vehicles of which they are made up.

Our industry and troops have accumulated some experience in the area of automation of control and are capable of accomplishing this task on a high scientific and technical level. In order to give this work a more active and purposeful character, we invited to our exercise the chief designers and representatives of the industry engaged in the development and production of the means of automating the control of troops, weapons, and combat equipment. This was undoubtedly useful both to them and to us.

During the exercise, they had an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the method and nature of our work and they got a picture of what means of automation we need for accomplishing combat tasks. There is no doubt that a knowledge of the specifics of troop control processes will enable scientists and designers to experiment more daringly and to more actively seek the most effective ways to materially advance the solution of this important problem.

TS #788301  
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Page 77 of 119 Pages

On the basis of a study of troop control methods, we must together with scientists find an overall approach to the development of specifications for control equipment that would guarantee the possibility of connecting the means of automation in all the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries at different control levels. It is necessary to form a unified plan of development and organization of the production of means of automating control. Realization of this plan will also require finding the appropriate organizational forms of work that unify the efforts of the military specialists, scientists, designers, and industrial enterprises of the socialist commonwealth countries.

It seems that if we worked more harmoniously and together solved the crucial and complex problems in the area of automation we would not have such unwieldy mobile command posts as we saw in the exercise.

We support the initiative of the military districts and armies in solving the problems of the automation of troop control. This work must be continued still further. All we have to do is incorporate an element of organization into it and unify our efforts and then we will achieve more tangible results in short periods of time.

#### PROBLEMS OF COOPERATION

In all exercises we devote primary attention to working out the problems of cooperation. We attach particularly great importance to the organization of cooperation among allied armies.

The success of operations in war will, to a considerable extent, be determined in accordance with how we work out cooperation in peacetime.

In our armies there is a reliable political and military-technical base for cooperation. This was demonstrated by the exercise conducted. To our general satisfaction, in all of its stages, the problems of cooperation were solved properly on the whole. Commanders and staffs nearly always knew the situation of the forces adjacent to them and adopted decisions with due regard for it.

Problems of cooperation between aviation and air defense troops, between the Combined Baltic Fleet and the coastal front, and between the air armies of adjacent fronts were solved somewhat worse. There, due mutual understanding was not always felt, not all tasks were accomplished

TS #788301  
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Page 78 of 119 Pages

in a coordinated manner, and mutual reporting was lacking.

For example, cooperation was not organized precisely and concretely enough between the 30th Air Army (commander, General-Mayor of Aviation A. N. ZAKREVSKY) and the 109th Airborne Division during the flight of the latter through the zone of the 4th Front. The air army was supposed to provide patrol escort of the echelons of military transport aviation, clear the airspace, block the enemy's fighter aviation airfields, and neutralize his air defense means. However, not only was this not planned as it ought to be by the air army, but its commander did not even know the task of the landing force, the landing area, the flight route of the aircraft of military transport aviation, nor the procedure for their air support.

But to organize cooperation is only half the matter; it is necessary to learn to maintain it constantly. Widely used for this during the exercise were such developed and proven forms of maintaining cooperation as the exchange between staffs of operations groups and liaison officers and constant reporting about the situation over various communications channels, the establishment of personal contacts of commanders and staff officers, the exchange of different types of documents, and others. All these forms of organizing cooperation yield positive results and deserve further improvement.

We acquired interesting experience in the use of operations groups of the general staffs of allied armies in a strategic operation. They gave substantial help in supporting the regroupings of troops of the reserve fronts and ensuring the timeliness of their commitment to the engagement. The procedure of coordination by these groups of the questions of organizing air defense and road traffic control service on the routes and engineer and materiel-technical support of the troops during their movement on the territory of the allied countries deserves attention.

It is interesting to note that cooperation was organized during the exercise not only to accomplish combat tasks, but also to increase the effectiveness of party political work.

We must develop cooperation further at different levels, perfect its forms, share experience in this area, and incorporate everything positive into our working and combat training practice.

TS #788301  
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Page 79 of 119 Pages

## RADIOELECTRONIC WARFARE

This is one of the most acute problems not sufficiently worked out, and for this reason it requires the special attention of formation and large unit commanders and staffs. Disruption of the radioelectronic control systems of the enemy under the conditions of highly dynamic mobile warfare will greatly favor the success of our troops. And conversely, unless we learn to wage effective warfare with the radioelectronic means employed by the enemy to control troops and means of destruction, he may completely disorganize our control, complicate the conduct of the operation, and incapacitate a considerable amount of combat equipment.

However, in hearing the decisions of commanders and the reports of chiefs of staff and other generals and officers, we got the impression that not all of them are fully aware of the seriousness of the problem of radioelectronic warfare. A definite underrating of the capabilities of the enemy to disrupt our control systems was noted among certain commanders; it was not taken into account that he is strenuously preparing for "radio warfare," has a large arsenal of weapons and means for these purposes, and regards effective use of them as one of the most important factors in the achievement of victory.

It is this underrating of the enemy that may primarily explain the fact that a considerable portion of the decisions on radioelectronic warfare were drawn up on the calculation of neutralizing the radioelectronic means of the enemy with jamming and that altogether insufficient use was made of artillery, aviation, and other weapons to destroy them.

Such decisions cannot be deemed correct. It should be kept firmly in mind that after a certain time a neutralized means will be restored and could jam our radioelectronic means again, but one that is destroyed will not operate any more. It is necessary to employ both neutralization and destruction of the radioelectronic means of the enemy intelligently and in a coordinated manner and at the same time to prepare our own control systems for protection against enemy jamming and weapons and for stable operation of radiotechnical means.

We should understand thoroughly what great potential capabilities the means of radioelectronic warfare have to do harm in the conduct of operations. Therefore, all commanders and staff officers must constantly study them and work out the methods of using them.

TS #788301  
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Page 80 of 119 Pages

Deserving support in this connection is the proposal of the Minister of National Defense of the Polish People's Republic, Comrade JARUZELSKI, on organizing two- to three-month courses to study the means and methods of radioelectronic warfare, to which the main body of our command cadres should be sent. This matter requires the most serious attention.

#### REAR SERVICES AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT

The materiel requirements of troops increase in connection with the growth of their technical equipment. Calculations show that, unless timely measures are taken to strengthen the rear, then many rear services large units and units will be incapable of supporting troops continuously. Medical support becomes a serious problem in connection with the sharp growth of medical casualties. All of this requires further improvement of the organizational structure and technical equipping of the rear services organs.

Deserving special attention is the advance stockpiling and proper echeloning of materiel reserves in the theater of military operations in order, along with preserving the high mobility of troops, to ensure the long-term autonomy of their actions.

Acquiring primary importance when troop regroupings are being carried out is the establishment of the necessary fuel reserves, proper echeloning of them in the march formations, dependable security and protection from means of mass destruction, and also air cover of the rear in the zone of movement. If these requirements had been observed among the troops of the 5th Front, they would have been able to complete the regrouping in the established time limits.

The role of the technical support service has grown considerably. Under modern conditions, a large part of the combat equipment will have to be restored at the front. This will require having in the theater the necessary technical support forces and means, reserves of parts and assemblies, and other technical items.

The experience of exercises shows that, to increase the effectiveness of rear services and technical support of the allied troops in exercises conducted jointly, it is necessary to use common norms and methods for determining the condition of rear services and requirements for materiel-technical means. It is very important also to achieve

TS #788301  
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Page 81 of 119 Pages

standardization and unification of armament, rear services equipment, and other materiel, similarity in structure of the rear services organs of the allied armed forces, establishment of a unified supply system, and an increase of the traffic capacity of the transportation lines of our countries. The rear services organs must devote daily attention to the accomplishment of these tasks.

## VI. PARTY POLITICAL WORK

Comrades, in guiding military development, our Party always has attached and attaches paramount importance to party political work. "Party political work with the personnel and their ideological tempering," Leonid Ilich BREZHNEV has said, "have always been and remain mighty weapons of our Party. The strength of these weapons has been tried in the fire of battles. They frighten our enemies even now." Party political work among us is closely tied in with the accomplishment of the tasks of readying the armed forces for combat.

In the exercise just completed, all the work of the political organs and Party organizations was subordinate to ensuring the staff officers' efficient and responsible fulfilment of their duties in the exercise. The political organs and Party organizations showed great energy and skilfully combined the conduct of general political measures with individual work. During the exercise, we saw in the staffs a businesslike work situation and friendly, coordinated work at all control levels. This testifies to the real efforts of commanders, political organs, and Party organizations.

A considerable number of communications and support units took part in the exercise. Party political work in these, as a rule, was carried on concretely, and personnel acted with full exertion of energies. Much work in communications units was done by the political directorate of the 5th Front (chief of political directorate, General-Major N. D. SHEVKUN) and the political department of the General Staff communications center (chief of political department, Colonel R. V. TYURIN).

During the exercise, the staff officers and personnel of the communications and support units were always current on the most important political events in our country and abroad. The organic connection of political work with the tasks to be accomplished by the troops and the effectiveness of the work were vividly manifested in the vigorous and diligent actions of the participants in the exercise. During the exercise

TS #788301  
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Page 82 of 119 Pages

there were no incidents or unprincipled occurrences, nor any complaints about difficulties, much less negative attitudes.

The political organs in this exercise continued to gain experience and improve the methods of planning the organization of political work in front and army operations. The political directorate of the 2nd Front (chief of political directorate, Colonel General I. S. MEDNIKOV) and that of the 4th Front (chief of political directorate, General-Leytenant A. V. DEBALYUK) showed a proper understanding of the nature and principles of organizing political work in a modern battle and operation. This cannot be said of the political departments of the 28th Army (chief of political department, General-Leytenant K. A. MAKSIMOV), the 9th Tank Army (chief of political department, General-Mayor B. F. KUDINOV), or the 14th Separate Air Defense Army (chief of political department, General-Mayor I. D. STOPNIKOV), nor of the political directorate of the Baltic Fleet (chief of political directorate, Vice Admiral N. I. SHABLIKOV).

Mention should be made of the useful and productive work done in the exercise by the operations group of the Chief Political Directorate.

Unfortunately, the organization and conduct of party political work in the exercise were not without shortcomings. Some political organs, particularly at the army levels of the 4th and 5th Fronts, did not fully utilize the time allowed by the situation during the period of threat -- including the time during regrouping -- to carry out party political work. In the 2nd Front, some armies, the 5th Army in particular, did not devote the necessary attention to organizing political work in the defense.

To what matters would we like to direct the attention of military councils and political organs?

First, it is necessary to intensify the search for more effective methods of ideological political work with the personnel when the armed forces are being converted from peace to war status. We must do everything so that our superiority over the enemy in morale and political consciousness is fully manifested already in the first engagements.

Second, when organizing political work in the staffs, commanders, political organs, and Party organizations must direct the efforts of the generals, admirals, and officers toward finding new, more effective methods of controlling troops, toward developing in them a creative approach to the matters entrusted to them and to the resolution of questions of military theory and practice, and toward improving their professional training.

TS #788301  
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Page 83 of 119 Pages

Third, the exercise conducted has enriched the experience of the political organs of our armies in the organization of contacts between them under the conditions of a combat situation. It is important that these contacts grow stronger and improve in the future.

#### VII. ASSESSMENT OF THE WORK OF COMMANDERS AND STAFFS

Permit me to dwell briefly on an assessment of the work of the commanders and staffs.

We have exchanged opinions on the results of the exercise conducted with the national defense ministers of the German Democratic Republic, General of the Army, Comrade Heinz HOFFMANN, of the Polish People's Republic, General of the Army, Comrade Wojciech JARUZELSKI, and of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, General of the Army, Comrade Martin DZUR; and we have come to the conclusion that, on the whole, the work of the commanders and staffs in the exercise can be assessed positively. We mention with satisfaction that the overwhelming majority of the generals, admirals, and officers of the allied armies demonstrated the proper skill in work and an ability to effectively utilize modern means of combat and organize the combat actions of subordinate troops and naval forces for the joint fulfilment of assigned tasks.

Operations groups of the main and general staffs of the allied armies took part in the exercise. Their work promoted the successful conduct of the exercise.

The operations group of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, headed by Chief of the General Staff, General of Arms Florian SIWICKI, showed itself to be a well prepared control organ. The questions of converting the country from peace to war status, of moving its troops up to the front line, and of supporting the movement of allied armies over the territory of the country were worked out precisely. Mention should be made of the close cooperation of the operations group of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces with the staff of the Commander-in-Chief in the Theater of Military Operations, and with the staffs of the 4th and 5th Fronts to support their regrouping over the territory of the Polish People's Republic. The group worked in an organized manner. The decisions adopted were substantiated and appropriate to the situation.

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Page 84 of 119 Pages

The operations group of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak People's Army, headed by Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Karel RUSOV, worked with creativity and organization. It planned with timeliness the preparation of the troops of the 3rd Front for combat actions and the measures to support the regrouping of the troops of the 5th Front and the 28th Army over the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. We should especially mention the thorough practical working out by the operations group of the problem of replenishing the combat losses of the 3rd Front.

Headed by Chief of the Main Staff of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, Colonel General Heinz KESSLER, the operations group of the Main Staff worked in a complex situation and brought about real cooperation with the Polish and Soviet troops. The operations group drew the correct conclusions from an assessment of the military-political situation and with timeliness and precision accomplished the tasks of mobilizing and deploying the troops and replenishing the losses sustained.

We consider it advisable to recommend to the operations groups of the main and general staffs that they perfect even further their work in support of the tasks to be accomplished by the allied armies in a strategic operation in the Western Theater of Military Operations.

The commander of the 1st Front, General of Arms Eugeniusz MOLCZYK, correctly accomplished the tasks assigned to the front, capably assessed the situation, made well-founded decisions, and competently organized their fulfilment.

The field headquarters and staff of the front (front chief of staff, General of Division Stanislaw ANTOS) worked with great intensity. They exercised firm control of troops and saw to the preparation of the necessary proposals and calculations. The questions of preparing and conducting a landing operation should be worked out in greater detail.

The commander of the 12th Air Army, General of Division Tadeusz KREPSKI, showed himself to be a knowledgeable general who understands the nature of modern operations. In controlling the aviation of the army, he assiduously achieved fulfilment of the assigned tasks.

The staff of the army is well knit and capable of organizing continuous control of the subordinate large units and units. At the same time, the staff must try to achieve more precise and well-thought-out planning of the combat actions of aviation in an air operation.

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Page 85 of 119 Pages

The commander of the 2nd Front, General of the Army Ye. F. IVANOVSKIY, adopted appropriate, well-founded decisions and controlled the troops confidently and firmly.

The field headquarters and staff of the front (chief of staff, Colonel General D. A. GRINKEVICH) are essentially well prepared as control organs; they worked harmoniously, conveyed tasks with timeliness, and ensured stable control of the subordinate troops. They should devote attention to more thorough working out of the questions of repelling an enemy invasion and to detailed performance of operational calculations for making decisions.

The commander of the 5th Army, General-Leytenant P. Ye. MAKARCHUK, on the whole properly assessed the situation and adopted appropriate decisions on repelling the enemy invasion and conducting the offensive. He should perfect his ability to precisely assign tasks to subordinate troops and monitor their fulfilment.

The staff of the army worked efficiently and purposefully and actively assisted the commander in controlling troops. It is necessary to more thoroughly assess the enemy, especially his measures at the stage of immediate preparation of an invasion.

The commander of the 10th Army, General-Mayor I. P. VOLKHOVSKIY, worked energetically during the exercise. The decisions he adopted essentially corresponded to the situation. We recommend to Comrade VOLKHOVSKIY that in his work he concentrate his main attention on accomplishing the chief tasks which ensure achievement of the assigned objectives.

The staff of the army showed itself to be prepared and capable of the work. It carried out the planning of combat actions correctly, but in working it allowed itself to be sluggish, especially when accomplishing tasks that came up suddenly. It should increase its working efficiency.

The commander of the 3rd Tank Army, General-Leytenant N. I. POPOV, assiduously achieved fulfilment of the assigned tasks while controlling the troops of the army.

There are no particular comments about the work of the staff of the army. It fulfilled the tasks assigned to it.

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Page 86 of 119 Pages

The commander of the 18th Air Army, Colonel General of Aviation A. I. BABAYEV, worked intensely and with great vigor in the exercise, adopted essentially appropriate decisions, and skilfully organized fulfilment of them.

The staff of the army accomplished the assigned tasks properly in the exercise. It is necessary to pay more attention to qualitative assessment of the strength of our own and the enemy's air forces.

The commander of the 3rd Front, Colonel General Frantisek VESELY, correctly assessed the situation and accomplished the tasks assigned to the troops of the front. In working, he displayed organization and precision.

The field headquarters and staff of the front (chief of staff, General-Leytenant Vaclavik MILAN [sic--Milan VACLAVIK]) planned combat actions with quality and timeliness. The documents they worked out were remarkable for the proper staff skills. They worked in an organized fashion during the exercise. More attention should be paid to the questions of cooperation with adjacent forces and of materiel-technical support.

The commander of the 7th Air Army, General-Mayor Jaroslav MATYC, adopted correct decisions on the combat employment of aviation and assiduously achieved fulfilment of them.

The staff of the air army efficiently resolved questions of the planning and fulfilment of tasks for cover and support of the combat actions of the troops of the front. It should pay attention to the questions of organizing the actions of aviation under night conditions.

The commander of the 4th Front, Colonel General of Tank Troops M. M. ZAYTSEV, drew the correct conclusions from the situation developing during the exercise. He adopted well-founded decisions. He should rely more on the staff in working on the preparation of an operation and the control of troops.

The field headquarters and staff of the front (chief of staff, General-Leytenant V. N. KONCHITS) showed themselves to be a prepared control organ, worked with organization, and ensured control of the troops of the front. They should improve work on collecting situation data and performing operational calculations.

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Page 87 of 119 Pages

The commander of the 32nd Army, General-Mayor G. G. ARMENOPOLOV, worked intensely in the exercise and handled responsibilities well.

There are no special comments about the work of the staff. The tasks assigned in the exercise were accomplished correctly on the whole.

The commander of the 9th Tank Army, General-Leytenant I. A. GASHKOV, skilfully organized the work of the field headquarters and directed the combat actions of the army.

The staff of the army on the whole worked harmoniously and planned the regrouping and combat actions of the troops in keeping with the situation that had developed.

The commander of the 30th Air Army, General-Mayor of Aviation A. N. ZAKREVSKIY, adopted appropriate decisions on combat actions and correctly accomplished the tasks assigned to the army. He should analyze the overall developing situation more thoroughly.

The staff of the army accomplished its task, but planning of the rebasing of aviation and control of it during the regrouping of front troops were carried out without due substantiation or specificity.

The commander of the 5th Front, Colonel General V. I. VARENNIKOV, worked purposefully and thoughtfully, assessed the situation correctly, adopted well-founded decisions, and skilfully organized their fulfilment.

The field headquarters and staff of the front (chief of staff, General-Leytenant M. A. TYAGUNOV) are well prepared as control organs. They did a great deal to set up and equip control posts and accomplished tasks with assurance in the exercise. In staff training, it is necessary to pay more attention to improving the quality of planning the regrouping of troops of the front and of organizing cooperation.

The commander of the 18th Army, General-Mayor R. M. SAVOCHKIN, adopted decisions that corresponded to the situation that had developed and controlled troops with assurance.

The staff of the army on the whole accomplished its tasks in the exercise. It is necessary to plan matters of support of the regrouping of troops of the army more thoughtfully.

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Page 88 of 119 Pages

The commander of the 19th Air Army, General-Mayor of Aviation E. V. TSOKOLAYEV, was acting in the position of commander of an army for the first time in the exercise. He acquired practice in command. The decisions he adopted did not always ensure concentration of the main efforts of the army on the performance of the chief tasks. He handled exercise tasks well.

The staff of the army showed great endeavor and an ability to accomplish the assigned tasks, but often made qualitative and quantitative assessments of the enemy superficially.

The commander of the 9th Army of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, General-Mayor Horst SKERRA, controlled combat actions of the army firmly, adopted correct decisions, and assiduously achieved fulfilment of them.

The staff of the army (chief of staff, General-Mayor Kurt GOTTWALD) worked energetically and displayed the necessary organization. It competently saw to the execution of the decisions adopted and the fulfilment of the assigned combat tasks. It worked out planning and combat documents in full and with quality.

The commander of the 28th Army, Colonel General D. S. SUKHORUKOV, exercised control of subordinate troops with assurance. The decisions he adopted were aggressive in nature and suited the situation that had developed.

The staff of the army (chief of staff, General-Mayor V. M. KOZHBAKHTEYEV) worked in an organized manner during the exercise, made well-founded proposals, and saw to the fulfilment of the tasks assigned to the army.

The commander of the 23rd Army, Colonel General O. F. KULISHEV, assiduously carried on the search for better methods of accomplishing the tasks assigned to the army and achieved fulfilment of them. He handled exercise tasks well.

The staff of the army (chief of staff, General-Mayor R. G. RIZATDINOV) worked with efficiency and organization in the exercise and is well prepared as a control organ. It should plan with higher quality and more detail the commitment of troops of the army to an engagement and the organization of combat against enemy antitank means.

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The commander of the 5th Separate Air Defense Army, General-Leytenant A. I. KUZMENKO, analyzed the operational and air situation thoroughly and comprehensively and adopted well-founded decisions.

The staff of the army fulfilled the assigned tasks. It is necessary to pay attention to more precise organization of cooperation.

The commander of the 14th Separate Air Defense Army, Colonel General of Aviation V. D. LAVRINENKOV, is an experienced, well prepared general. He directed the actions of the army with assurance.

The staff of the army is well prepared; there are no special comments about its work.

The commander of the Combined Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral A. M. KOSOV, worked energetically in the exercise and competently organized the conduct of combined combat actions of the allied forces and means belonging to the Combined Fleet. He controlled subordinate forces with assurance.

The fleet chief of staff, Rear Admiral A. M. KALININ, approached the accomplishment of assigned tasks creatively and directed the work of the staff correctly.

The staff of the fleet worked intensely, but it did not pay due attention to organizing cooperation with the other branches of the armed forces, above all with the ground forces.

#### VIII. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND TASKS

Comrades, we believe that, on the whole, the exercise proceeded in an organized manner and instructively and that it was useful to all its participants. The assigned training objectives were achieved. The work of the commanders and staffs proceeded in a businesslike atmosphere, in a spirit of brotherly friendship and full mutual understanding.

The exercise participants showed a creative and conscientious attitude toward their responsibilities and an endeavor to accomplish the assigned tasks as well as possible. The exercise has promoted the further development of our command personnel and operational staffs in the art of planning and organizing combat actions and controlling troops, and it has demonstrated their ability to accomplish tasks in a complex situation.

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The experience acquired during the exercise will enable us to refine certain questions of the operational art and strategy of the conduct of war in the Western Theater and to use a number of useful conclusions in the practice of combat and operational training and in the training of commanders and staffs. We were once again convinced that our allied troops and navies are capable not only of repelling aggression, but also of inflicting a decisive defeat on the enemy.

What tasks confront us on the basis of the lessons of the exercise conducted?

First. The further increase of the combat readiness of the armed forces. The progress of the exercise confirmed that the conditions of the conversion of our armed forces from peace to war status and of their deployment, movement, and entry into war grow more complex each year. This requires a further increase of the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of the troops and naval forces.

The exercise showed also that our operations and mobilization plans must be worked out with due regard for all the diversity of the military-political and strategic situation in the theater. Any changes in the situation and the grouping of troops, the adoption of new models of weapons and military equipment into service, new trends in the tactics and strategy of the probable enemy, must promptly call for refinement of our decisions and implementation of the appropriate precautionary measures. Of great importance to us are reduction of the time required to bring large units, units, ships, weapons, and equipment into full combat readiness and improvement of the actions of means on alert. We must in every possible way increase the mobilization readiness of the troops and navies, develop the maneuvering capabilities and survivability of large units and units, and improve the protection of reserves of materiel.

One of the most important tasks is thorough study of the probable enemy and timely warning about an attack being prepared, particularly about his presumable actions with the use of nuclear weapons. This requires our reconnaissance to persistently get reliable data about the status and all changes in position and actions of the enemy. Without this it is hard to give a proper assessment of the situation and adopt a well-founded decision.

Second. Further improvement of the technical equipping of our armies. You know that a characteristic feature of the current period of development of the armed forces is the sharp increase in the struggle for military

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Page 91 of 119 Pages

technical superiority. In the US, the Federal Republic of Germany, England, France, and other capitalist countries, work is proceeding on a broad front to produce the latest models of armament and military equipment and provide the troops with them. This obliges us, too, to take steps in time so as not to lag behind the probable enemies.

Our fraternal communist and workers' parties are making great efforts to technically improve the allied armies and navies and arm them with new models of combat equipment. The relative proportion of new tanks, artillery systems, surface-to-air [missile] systems, aircraft, helicopters, surface ships, and submarines in our armed forces is being increased. As a result of this, the qualitative indices of our armies are improving more and more, their striking force, firepower, and maneuverability are growing, and their combat capabilities are increasing.

We must go on devoting unflagging attention to the qualitative improvement of our armament. In developing conventional types of weapons, it is necessary to achieve a sharp increase in their effectiveness, probability of performing complex combat tasks, dependability, and trouble-free operation under combat conditions. Simultaneously with this, it is necessary to carry on a diligent search to develop fundamentally new types and systems of weapons on the basis of the latest achievements of science and technology.

It is very important that each of the fraternal countries contribute its share to the cause of improving the technical equipping of our armies so that our military technical achievements become the property of the entire socialist commonwealth. We have great opportunities for this. It is only necessary to organize coordinated work on the development of new weapons systems and means of automation of control.

Third. Increasing the effectiveness of combat employment of the troops and naval forces. In order to capitalize on the growing combat capabilities of the armed forces, it is necessary to set a determined course toward a further increase of the effectiveness of using weapons in operations and in battle, toward perfecting the military art of formation and large unit commanders, staffs, and troops, and toward thorough exploration of the combat characteristics, conditions, and nature of employing weapons in different situations. It is necessary to teach staffs and technical services to prudently and thoughtfully plan and exploit the available technical resources of vehicles and knowledgeably organize the operation and servicing of combat equipment and weapons.

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Simultaneously with mastering the new combat equipment and weapons, it is necessary to work out and master new, more perfect methods of combat actions. Now as never before, this matter requires the display of innovation and creative initiative and the building of an arsenal of operational and tactical techniques not expected by the enemy.

Particularly acute is the problem of increasing the survivability of troops under conditions of the use of not only nuclear but also conventional weapons. The probable enemy is persistently improving the conventional weapons available in the armies in the direction of increasing their destructive capabilities and accuracy in hitting a target.

All of this poses great, complex problems for us. The main thing now consists in more fully and deeply exploring the effect of the newest types of weapons and combat equipment on the nature of an operation and battle and on the forms and methods of conducting them, and in working out effective countermeasures and methods of protection.

In this connection, I would direct attention to increasing the effectiveness and quality of all our combat training. Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV, in speaking of effectiveness and quality, has been stressing that "these two words have now become the motto of all economic activity. They express the objective demands of the present stage of development of the national economy." An increase of the attention paid to the effectiveness and qualitative factors of military activity has become a vital necessity in the combat improvement of an army or fleet. This, one may say, is the general line of further development of our armed forces.

And this task is not abstract or theoretical, but a thoroughly concrete, practical, day-to-day matter.

Fourth. Further development of collaboration of the armies of the Warsaw Pact member states. Collaboration among our armies is being strengthened and developed in all directions. We have a unity of views on all fundamental questions of military development and we regularly share our achievements in this area with one another. Every army, every country, makes its contribution to the common cause of strengthening the defensive capability of the socialist commonwealth and assists the development of the theory and practice of military affairs. Nevertheless, the contemporary military-political situation in Europe and the world requires still more coordinated efforts in the accomplishment of defense tasks and the working out of questions of combined actions.

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Page 93 of 119 Pages

This applies above all to the further improvement of our operations plans, the refinement of matters of cooperation, the development of common principles of combat and operational training of troops and naval forces, to the training of officer personnel, and to the methods of instruction and indoctrination of personnel.

Particularly important is the question of the pursuit of a common technical policy by our armies that is directed toward ensuring continuous progress in the area of armaments and toward developing and producing models of combat equipment which, for as long as possible, would not become obsolete and would be the most effective. In other words, the task is for each type of weapon, with the least expenditure of resources on its development, production, and operation, to have the highest combat specifications; this applies above all to its destructive properties and mobility. A common military technical policy is acknowledged to be conducive to a coordinated conversion of our armies to new equipment and to an acceleration of the rates of unifying and standardizing armaments.

It is necessary to study the economics of war more thoroughly and take into account that, as weapons and combat equipment are improved, their cost grows. It is incumbent upon us to spend the resources allocated for military purposes rationally and to concentrate efforts on accomplishing the main military technical tasks that ensure an increase of the combat effectiveness of the armed forces.

Fifth. The need to further increase political vigilance. We must not even for a minute forget that the imperialist circles are constantly increasing subversive work against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth, and trying to weaken the attractive force of socialism and distort in the eyes of the working masses the picture of true socialism and its achievements. Under the conditions of such a step-up of the intelligence and subversive activity and ideological sabotage of the imperialist circles, political indifference and gullibility are particularly intolerable.

Therefore, the political organs and Party organizations of the armed forces must see to the further increase of the effectiveness of party political work to indoctrinate servicemen in a spirit of high political vigilance, strictest preservation of military secrecy, and constant combat readiness to protect the socialist gains of our peoples.

Sixth. Summary of results of the exercise conducted. Today we have drawn up tentative conclusions. It goes without saying that our critique

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Page 94 of 119 Pages

could not embrace all the questions that came up in the course of the exercise and there is still much work to be done on the materials obtained, which provide a wealth of food for thought and solutions to many vital questions of military affairs. Nothing must slip by us, nothing be omitted. Everything must be considered, studied, and worked over. Every question that came up must find an answer. It is not out of the question that certain matters of military science and military art will have to be refined as a result of this work.

Certain conclusions from the exercise can and must be utilized in developing combat equipment and, first of all, the means of control. I would recommend that the industrial designers and workers present here do some solid work together with the military specialists, take from our exercise everything useful and necessary for further determining the path of development of armament and military equipment.

Comrades:

The year 1977 is a jubilee. The men of the Soviet Armed Forces and other fraternal armies together with the peoples of our countries will mark the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The October Revolution has been the main event of our century, radically changing the course of history of all mankind, determining new paths of social development, and laying the foundation for the building of a worldwide socialist system. We must celebrate the glorious anniversary of the October Revolution worthily by further raising the level of combat and political training and combat readiness of large units, units, and ships.

In the Soviet Armed Forces, we made this task the basis of socialist competition among the men for high marks in combat and political training in the summer training period. We are pleased that the men of the other fraternal armies were also involved in socialist competition in honor of the 60th Anniversary of the Revolution.

Discussion of the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR has now spread among the troops. High political enthusiasm reigns among the personnel. It is important that all of this be directed toward the successful fulfillment of assigned tasks. And we are confident that the men of our armed forces will apply all efforts in order to come to the nationwide celebration of the October Revolution with high marks.

Lenin's instructions on the necessity of strengthening the defensive capability of our country and guarding our army as the apple of our eye are

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Page 95 of 119 Pages

as timely today as formerly. Guided by these instructions, the Communist Party constantly sees that the Soviet Armed Forces have everything necessary to safely protect the peaceful constructive labor of the people. Ardent patriots and staunch internationalists, the Soviet servicemen respond to the Party's care with irreproachable fulfillment of their duty. Devoutly obeying the precepts of V. I. LENIN, they are genuinely studying military affairs, assiduously mastering modern equipment and weapons, and strengthening combat readiness.

Shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet fighting men in the united formation of the defenders of socialism, peace, and progress march the men of the armies of the Warsaw Pact member states. And our united formation, friendship, and fidelity to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism are as firm and strong as ever. (Applause.)

Comrades, in conclusion, permit me in your name to sincerely thank the central committees of the fraternal parties and the governments of the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for affording us the opportunity to conduct this great exercise. (Applause.)

The population and local party organs of Belorussia, the Ukraine, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia showed a warm, friendly attitude and attention toward the participants in the exercise. Permit me in the name of all the participants in the exercise to express our sincere gratitude to them for this. (Applause.)

I express profound thanks to the ministers of national defense of the German Democratic Republic, General of the Army, Comrade Heinz HOFFMANN, of the Polish People's Republic, General of the Army, Comrade Wojciech JARUZELSKI, and of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, General of the Army, Comrade Martin DZUR, for active participation in the exercise and giving us assistance during its preparation and conduct and for the care and hospitality they showed. (Applause.)

I thank the Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, General of the Army, Comrade Yevgeniy Filippovich IVANOVSKIY, and the Commander of the Northern Group of Forces, Colonel General, Comrade Oleg Fedorovich KULISHEV for bringing about the necessary conditions for the work of the Staff of the Directing Body. (Applause.)

I mention the great work done during the preparation and course of the exercise by the Staff of the Directing Body, headed by Chief of the General

TS #788301  
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Page 96 of 119 Pages

Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade Nikolay Vasilyevich OGARKOV, and to my closest assistants, the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the armed forces, the chiefs of the branch arms, services, and directorates of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, and also to the umpire organization. I express my thanks to them for this. (Applause.)

I thank the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade Viktor Georgiyevich KULIKOV, the Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces, General of the Army, Comrade Anatoliy Ivanovich GRIBKOV, and the generals and officers of the staff who took an active part in the preparation and conduct of the exercise. (Applause.)

Much very important work in support of the conduct of the exercise was done by our communications personnel. The communications system they set up ensured the stable control of troops and navies and enabled the directing body and the umpire organization to control the course of the exercise and have a timely effect on the actions of commanders and staffs. I express thanks to all the communications personnel for this. (Applause.) \*

I express my firm conviction that the completed exercise will promote the further strengthening of the combat readiness and combat cooperation of our armed forces and serve as an important stimulus in their successful accomplishment of the tasks set by the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties. The complexity and diversity of these tasks suggests the necessity of conducting combined exercises of a similar nature in the future.

Permit me in your name and the name of all the participants in the exercise to assure the central committees of our Marxist-Leninist parties that the personnel of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states will in the future assiduously increase combat readiness and strengthen unity, friendship, and fraternal cooperation, and that our armed forces will always be true to their military duty -- to be the reliable guardian of the socialist gains of our peoples and the bulwark of peace on earth. (Applause.)

I wish you, beloved comrades, much success in your great and noble work. (Applause.)

All the best to you. (Applause.)

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### CHARTS

The following charts, originally unnumbered, have been labeled to coincide with the table of contents and references in the text. Keys follow the last chart, with items arranged numerically, then alphabetically according to the Russian. Longer items are translated in keys to the individual charts. Items that recur on several charts are explained in one general key. On the map charts only, index numbers refer to a separate geographic names key.

#### Order of Russian alphabet

Аа Бб Вв Гг Дд Ее Жж Зз Ии Йй Кк Лл Мм Нн Оо Пп
Рр Сс Тт Уу Фф Хх Цц Чч Шш Щщ Ъъ Ыы Ьь Ээ Юю Яя

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
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Chart 1. INITIAL OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE EXERCISE ZAPAD-77 FOR 31 MAY

ИСХОДНАЯ ОПЕРАТИВНО-СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКАЯ ОБСТАНОВКА

НА УЧЕНИИ „ЗАПАД-77“ НА 31 мая

Page 98 of 119 Pages




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Chart 2. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC COMMAND-STAFF EXERCISE ZAPAD-77

Page 99 of 119 Pages



TOP SECRET

Page 100 of 119 Pages

Chart 3. DECISIONS OF THE COMMANDERS OF THE 2ND AND 3RD FRONTS TO REPEL THE ENEMY INVASION



TOP SECRET

TS #788301  
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TOP SECRET

Chart 4. DECISION OF THE COMMANDER OF THE COMBINED BALTIC FLEET ON THE CONDUCT OF COMBAT ACTIONS

РЕШЕНИЕ  
КОМАНДУЮЩЕГО ОБФ НА ВЕДЕНИЕ БОЕВЫХ ДЕЙСТВИЙ

Page 101 of 119 Pages



TS #788301  
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
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Page 102 of 119 Pages

Chart 5. RELOCATION OF CONTROL POSTS OF THE FRONTS DURING REGROUPING

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Note. Key to Geographic Names does not apply to this chart.

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Page 103 of 119 Pages

Chart 6. Table of working time indicators of the commanders and staffs of the fronts and armies when making decisions and planning the repulse of the enemy invasion and the regrouping

	Working Time													
	First operational echelon							Second operational echelon						Reserve
	2nd Front				3rd Front	28th Army	1st Front	4th Front			5th Front		9th Army	23rd Army
	Control post	5th Army	10th Army	3rd Tank Army				Control post	32nd Army	9th Tank Army	Control post	18th Army		
Directive (operational instructions) received by	2300 31 May	0040 1 June	0055 1 June	0050 1 June	2300 31 May	2300 31 May	2300 31 May	0800 31 May	1005 31 May	0940 31 May	1600 31 May	1905 31 May	2300 31 May	2300 31 May
Study of directive, ascertainment of task, assessment of situation, and determination of concept of operation (regrouping)	1hr 30m	0hr 40m	1hr 40m	3hr 10m	2hr 30m	2hr 00m	1hr 15m	1hr 20m	1hr 00m	1hr 20m	2hr 40m	0hr 55m	0hr 50m	1hr 55m
Delivery of preliminary instructions	2hr 30m	0hr 40m	0hr 20m	30m	30m	20m	2hr 15m	0hr 30m	0hr 30m	1hr 00m	0hr 35m	0hr 30m	2hr 00m	1hr 15m
Determination of tasks for troops	1hr 30m	0hr 45m	1hr 20m	0hr 50m	1hr 30m	1hr 00m	3hr 10m	1hr 30m	1hr 00m	1hr 00m	2hr 00m	0hr 55m	2hr 50m	1hr 00m
Planning of initial nuclear strike	4hr 30m													
Examination and approval of proposals on the employment of branch arms and special troops (services), resolution of questions of cooperation and all-round support	2hr 20m	1hr 25m	4hr 00m	2hr 30m	2hr 00m	3hr 15m	1hr 30m	7hr 00m	1hr 00m	1hr 00m	2hr 00m	1hr 30m	1hr 45m	1hr 30m
Announcement of decision		1hr 00m			0hr 30m	0hr 30m	0hr 40m	0hr 25m	0hr 30m	0hr 25m	1hr 00m	0hr 20m	0hr 25m	0hr 45m
Delivery of tasks to troops	5hr 35m				1hr 10m	1hr 30m	4hr 00m	1hr 07m	1hr 00m	0hr 55m	1hr 00m	0hr 20m		2hr 55m
Planning of operation (regrouping) completed by	2300 1 June	1830 1 June	2000 1 June	1450 1 June	2300 1 June	1500 1 June	1830 1 June	0600 1 June	2000 31 May	2300 31 May	1400 1 June	1630 1 June	0700 1 June	1200 1 June
Total time spent	24 hours	18 hours	19 hours	14 hours	24 hours	16 hours	19.5 hours	22 hours	10 hours	13 hours	22 hours	21.5 hours	8 hours	13 hours

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Chart 7. DECISIONS OF THE FRONT COMMANDERS ON COMMITMENT TO THE ENGAGEMENT AND CONDUCT OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Page 104 of 119 Pages




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Chart 7 A



Page 105 of 119 Pages

TS #788301  
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Chart 8. DECISIONS OF THE FRONT COMMANDERS CONCERNING THE SITUATION FOR 2000 HOURS OF 10 JUNE

Page 105 of 119 Pages




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Page 107 of 119 Pages



TS #788301  
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Page 108 of 119 Pages

Chart 9. BASIC DIAGRAM OF THE PLAY-OUT OF COMBAT ACTIONS IN EXERCISE ZAPAD-77



TS #788301  
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INITIAL OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE EXERCISE ZAPAD-77  
FOR 31 MAY

1 ФРОНТ  
2,3,5А;12ВА;4мдд;9мдд;20мд

1st Front  
2nd, 3rd, 5th Armies; 12th Air Army;  
4th Airborne Division; 9th Amphibious  
Landing Division; 20th Mechanized  
Division

2 ОТАН  
б. самолетов - 975  
носителей - 444

2nd Allied Tactical Air Force  
975 combat aircraft  
444 delivery vehicles

2 ФРОНТ  
5,10А;3,4ТА;18ВА;33мдд;73мдд;  
42тд

2nd Front  
5th, 10th Armies; 3rd, 4th Tank Ar-  
mies; 18th Air Army; 33rd Motorized  
Rifle Division; 73rd Motorized Rifle  
Division; 42nd Tank Division

3 ФРОНТ  
4,5,7А; 7ВА; 87тд

3rd Front  
4th, 5th, 7th Armies; 7th Air Army;  
87th Tank Division

4 ОТАН  
б. самолетов - 1266  
носителей - 756

4th Allied Tactical Air Force  
1266 combat aircraft  
756 delivery vehicles

4 ФРОНТ  
32,45А; 9,11ТА; 30ВА

4th Front  
32nd, 45th Armies; 9th, 11th Tank  
Armies; 30th Air Army

5 ФРОНТ  
18,43А; 13ТА; 32ан; 19ВА

5th Front  
18th, 43rd Armies; 13th Tank Army;  
32nd Army Corps; 19th Air Army

ЗОНА БАЛТИЙСКИХ ПРОЛИВОВ  
ак - 1, див - 5  
б. самолетов - 369  
носителей - 60

Zone of Baltic Straits  
1 army corps, 5 divisions  
369 combat aircraft  
60 delivery vehicles

Ratio of forces of first operational echelons of sides (table)

Name	West	East	Ratio
Divisions	49	46	1.1:1
Operational-tactical missile launchers	282	147	1.9:1
Tanks	12,678	11,000	1.2:1
Guns and mortars	7,989	6,900	1.2:1
Combat aircraft	2,743	1,470	1.8:1

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CONCEPT OF OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC COMMAND-STAFF EXERCISE ZAPAD-77

Theme of exercise: Deployment of groupings of the Armed Forces in the Western Theater of Military Operations. Repulse of an enemy invasion. Commitment of operational reserves to the engagement and development of the offensive under conditions of the use of nuclear weapons.

Conducting time: 10 days from 31 May through 9 June 1977

ВС АВСТРИИ  
ак - 2, див - 2

Armed Forces of Austria  
2 army corps, 2 divisions

ВС  
ФРАНЦИИ  
ак - 2, див - 25

Armed Forces  
of France  
2 army corps, 25 divisions

ВЫГРУЗКА ВОЙСК  
див - 5

Unloading of troops  
5 divisions

ФОРМИРОВАНИЕ  
ВОЙСК  
див - 6

Marshalling  
of troops  
6 divisions

Условная госграница

Provisional national border

STAGES OF THE EXERCISE

Third: Transition to the offensive and exploitation of success with the use of nuclear weapons.

Second: Conduct of combat actions to repel an enemy invasion. Movement of troops into the Theater of Military Operations. Commitment to the engagement of fronts of the second operational echelon.

First: Planning of the repulse of an enemy invasion, of deployment of fleet forces, and of regrouping of troops in the Theater of Military Operations.

Duration  
2-3 days

Duration  
3 days

Duration  
2 days

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Key to Chart 3

DECISIONS OF THE COMMANDERS OF THE 2ND AND 3RD FRONTS  
TO REPEL THE ENEMY INVASION

1 фр  
2,3,5A;12BA;4вдд;9мдд;20мд

2 фр  
5,10,22A; 3,4ТА; 73мсд

3 фр  
4,5,7A; 7 BA

4 фр  
32,45A; 9,11ТА; 30 BA

5 фр  
18,43A; 13ТА; 32ак; 19 BA

ЗАПАДНОЕ НАПРАВЛЕНИЕ  
ак - 17, див - 60

ЗОНА БАЛТИЙСКИХ ПРОЛИВОВ  
ак - 1, див - 5

1st Front  
2nd, 3rd, 5th Armies; 12th Air  
Army; 4th Airborne Division; 9th  
Amphibious Landing Division; 20th  
Mechanized Division

2nd Front  
5th, 10th, 22nd Armies; 3rd, 4th  
Tank Armies; 73rd Motorized Rifle  
Division

3rd Front  
4th, 5th, 7th Armies; 7th Air Army

4th Front  
32nd, 45th Armies; 9th, 11th Tank  
Armies; 30th Air Army

5th Front  
18th, 43rd Armies; 13th Tank Army;  
32nd Army Corps; 19th Air Army

Western Axis  
17 army corps, 60 divisions

Zone of Baltic Straits  
1 army corps, 5 divisions

TS #788301

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Key to Chart 5

Page 112 of 119 Pages

RELOCATION OF CONTROL POSTS OF THE FRONTS DURING REGROUPING

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1 Vysokoye [Belorussia]  | 25 515 kilometers<br>17 hours   |
| 2 Alternate command post   | 26 Rytnik [Poland]  |
| 3 Alternate command post<br>1420 1 June  | 27 20% of ops. personnel and communications<br>center of command post, 1130 2 June<br>Command post, 2200 2 June to 1315 5 June<br>Alternate CP, 1315 5 June |
| 4 Pruzhany [Belorussia]  | 28 Alternate command post<br>1130 2 June  |
| 5 Command post till 0900<br>Alternate CP from 0900<br>2 June   | 29 Alternate command post<br>2030 2 June  |
| 6 Commander, chief of staff of <u>front</u> ,<br>60% of operations personnel<br>0900 2 June                                    | 30 Commander,<br>60% of operations personnel<br>1200 5 June   |
| 7 Alternate CP, 20% of ops. personnel<br>1800 2 June   | 31 Front chief of staff<br>12 of operations personnel<br>1330 5 June  |
| 8 285 kilometers<br>7 hours  | 32 450 kilometers<br>12 hours   |
| 9 Skierniewice [Poland]  | 33 Olomouc [Czechoslovakia]   |
| 10 Alternate command post, 0210 2 June<br>Command post, 0930 2 June to 1900 3 June<br>Alternate CP, 1900 3 June to 0130 4 June | 34 Alternate CP, 2100 4 June<br>Command post, 1315 5 June   |
| 11 Commander, chief of staff of <u>front</u> ,<br>60% of operations personnel<br>1800 3 June                                   | 35 Torun [Poland]   |
| 12 Alternate command post<br>0130 4 June   | 36 Command post, 30 May to 1200 3 June<br>Alternate CP, 1200 3 June   |
| 13 800 kilometers<br>17 hours, 30 minutes  | 37 30% of operations personnel<br>2000 2 June   |
| 14 Swietoszw [Poland]  | 38 Commander, 20% of operations personnel<br>1030 3 June  |
| 15 Alternate CP, 1340 to 1900 3 June<br>Command post, 1900 3 June  | 39 Alternate command post<br>4 June   |
| 16 680 kilometers<br>17 hours, 35 minutes  | 40 240 kilometers   |
| 17 Alternate CP, 0400 to 0650 5 June<br>Command post, 0650 5 June  | 41 Oleszno [Poland]   |
| 18 Yavorov [Ukraine]   | 42 Alternate CP, 30 May to 1200 3 June<br>Command post, 1200 3 June to 1450 5 June  |
| 19 Protected command post  | 43 20% of operations personnel<br>0700 5 June   |
| 20 20% of ops. personnel of command post<br>Communications center of command post  | 44 500 kilometers   |
| 21 20% of ops. personnel of alternate CP<br>Communications center of alternate CP  | 45 Commander, chief of staff of <u>front</u> ,<br>5% of operations personnel in <u>YAK-40</u><br>1450 5 June  |
| 22 20% of ops. personnel and communications<br>center of command post<br>Alternate command post<br>1800 1 June                 | 46 35% of operations personnel [of]<br>command post in 6 AN-24's, 1525 5 June   |
| 23 Commander,<br>12 of operations personnel<br>2030 2 June   | 47 260 kilometers   |
| 24 Front chief of staff<br>12 of operations personnel<br>2200 2 June   | 48 Templin [East Germany]   |
|  | 49 Alternate CP, 2300 4 June to 1530 5 June<br>Command post, 1530 5 June to 1600 7 June   |

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Page 113 of 119 Pages

Key to Chart 7

DECISIONS OF THE FRONT COMMANDERS  
ON COMMITMENT TO THE ENGAGEMENT AND CONDUCT OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1 ФРОНТ

2,3,5A, 12BA, 7ак, 4вдд, 9мд

2 ФРОНТ

5, 10, 22, 23A, 3, 4TA, 18BA

3 ФРОНТ

4, 5, 7, 28A, 7BA

4 ФРОНТ

10, 32A, 9TA, 9A, 30BA

5 ФРОНТ

18, 43A, 32ак, 13TA, 19BA

1st Front

2nd, 3rd, 5th Armies, 12th Air Army,  
7th Army Corps, 4th Airborne Division,  
9th Mechanized Division

2nd Front

5th, 10th, 22nd, 23rd Armies, 3rd,  
4th Tank Armies, 18th Air Army

3rd Front

4th, 5th, 7th, 28th Armies, 7th Air  
Army

4th Front

10th, 32nd Armies, 9th Tank Army,  
9th Army, 30th Air Army

5th Front

18th, 43rd Armies, 32nd Army Corps,  
13th Tank Army, 19th Air Army

FRONT OPERATIONS INDICATORS

(table)

Indicators	1st Front			2nd Front			3rd Front			4th Front		
	Final task	Inter. task	Immed. task	Final task	Inter. task	Immed. task	Final task	Inter. task	Immed. task	Final task	Inter. task	Immed. task
Depth, km	700	350	350-380	600-700	300-350	300-350				300	225	280
Width of offensive zone, km	150 - 200			150 - 250						125 - 200		
Duration, days	13-16	6-7	7-9	12-14	6-7	6-7				9-13	4-5	6-7
Average rate of advance, km/day	50-65	55-65	45-55	50	50	50				40-50	40-50	30-40

TS #788301

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Page 114 of 119 Pages

Key to Chart 8

DECISIONS OF THE FRONT COMMANDERS CONCERNING THE SITUATION  
FOR 2000 HOURS OF 10 JUNE

1 ФРОНТ  
2,3,5,17A, 12BA, 20мд,  
9мдд, 4вдд

2 ФРОНТ  
5,22,23A, 4,11TA, 18BA, 7ак,  
58,73мсд, 19вдд

3 ФРОНТ  
4,5,7A, 7BA, 32ак

4 ФРОНТ  
10,32A, 3,9TA, 9A, 30BA

5 ФРОНТ  
18,28,43A, 13TA, 19BA

6 ФРОНТ  
45A, 30ак, 79тд

1st Front  
2nd, 3rd, 5th, 17th Armies, 12th  
Air Army, 20th Mechanized Division,  
9th Amphibious Landing Division,  
4th Airborne Division

2nd Front  
5th, 22nd, 23rd Armies, 4th, 11th  
Tank Armies, 18th Air Army, 7th  
Army Corps, 58th, 73rd Motorized  
Rifle Divisions, 19th Airborne  
Division

3rd Front  
4th, 5th, 7th Armies, 7th Air Army,  
32nd Army Corps

4th Front  
10th, 32nd Armies, 3rd, 9th Tank  
Armies, 9th Army, 30th Air Army

5th Front  
18th, 28th, 43rd Armies, 13th Tank  
Army, 19th Air Army

6th Front  
45th Army, 30th Army Corps, 79th  
Tank Division

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~~Key to Chart 9~~

Page 115 of 119 Pages

BASIC DIAGRAM OF THE PLAY-OUT OF COMBAT ACTIONS IN EXERCISE ZAPAD-77

- |    |   |    |  |
|----|---|----|--|
| 1  | USSR Minister of Defense  | 16 | Army senior umpire   |
| 2  | Commander-in-chief in theater of military operations                              | 17 | Role-playing group   |
| 3  | Exercise director   | 18 | Divisions  |
| 4  | Chief of staff of high command in theater of military opns                        | 19 | Role-playing groups for the divisions  |
| 5  | Directing body chief of staff   | 20 | Directives   |
| 6  | Staff of high command in theater of military operations                           | 21 | Reports on the situation and on the decisions adopted                                  |
| 7  | Operations directorate of staff of high command in theater of military operations | 22 | Reports of trainee decisions adopted   |
| 8  | Play-out control of combat actions  | 23 | Report of proposals on the play-out  |
| 9  | Directing body control of umpires   | 24 | Hour-for-hour buildup of situation for divisions                                       |
| 10 | Directing body staff  | 25 | Study and analysis of the work of commanders and staffs                                |
| 11 | <u>Fronts</u>   | 26 | Instructions on the play-out of combat actions   |
| 12 | <u>Front</u> headquarters   | 27 | Lines given after 12 hours   |
| 13 | <u>Front</u> senior umpire  | 28 | Lines given after 6 hours  |
| 14 | Armies  | 29 | Lines given after 3 hours  |
| 15 | Army headquarters   | 30 | Report with analysis of the work of commanders and staffs and of the decisions adopted |

TS #788301

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Key to charts

Page 116 of 119 Pages

1/81 ан "П"	1/81 Air Regiment "P"	2 ан Англ. 5,6,7 пд	2nd Army Corps England 5th, 6th, 7th Infantry Divisions
1 ад ФРГ	1st Air Division FRG	2 ан (Фр.) див - 3	2nd Army Corps (France) 3 divisions
1 ан	1st Army Corps	2 ан Фр. 1,3,7 пд	2nd Army Corps France 1st, 3rd, 7th Mechanized Divisions
1 ан пбр - 4	1st Army Corps 4 Infantry brigades	2 ан (ФРГ) див - 4	2nd Army Corps (FRG) 4 divisions
1 ан (Англ.) див - 4	1st Army Corps (England) 4 divisions	2 ан	2nd Army Corps
1 ан 1,2,4 брда, 3 пд	1st Army Corps 1st, 2nd, 4th Armored Divisions, 3rd Infantry Division	4,6 пд, 10 тд, ---д	4th, 6th Infantry Divisions, 10th Tank Division, --- Division
1 ан (А) 1,2,4 брда, 15 пд	1st Army Corps (England) 1st, 2nd, 4th Armored Divisions, 15th Infantry Division	2 ан (ФРГ) 4,21 пд, 10 тд	2nd Army Corps (FRG) 4th, 21st Infantry Divisions, 10th Tank Division
1 ан (Белг.) див - 4	1st Army Corps (Belgium) 4 divisions	2 ОТАН 6. самолетов - 975 носителей - 444	2nd Allied Tactical Air Force combat aircraft - 975 delivery vehicles - 444
1 ан 1, 16, 17, 18 пд	1st Army Corps 1st, 16th, 17th, 18th Mechanized Infantry Divisions	2 пбр	2nd Infantry Brigade
1 ан (Б) 16, 17, 18 пд	1st Army Corps (Belgium) 16th, 17th, 18th Mechanized Infantry Divisions	2 пд пбр - 3	2nd Infantry Division 3 Infantry brigades
1 ан (Гол.) див - 4	1st Army Corps (Holland) 4 divisions	2 ФР. 2 ФРОНТ	2nd Front
1 ан Гол. 1,3,4,5 пд	1st Army Corps Holland 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th Mechanized Infantry Divisions	2 эск "П"	2nd "P" Squadron
1 ан (Г) 3,4,5 пд	1st Army Corps (Holland) 3rd, 4th, 5th Mechanized Infantry Divisions	3/84 ан "П"	3/84 Air Regiment "P"
1 ан (ФРГ) див - 4	1st Army Corps (FRG) 4 divisions	3 А	3rd Army
1 ан (ФРГ) 1,7,8 пд, 3 тд	1st Army Corps (FRG) 1st, 7th, 8th Mechanized Infantry Divisions, 3rd Tank Division	3 ад ФРГ	3rd Air Division FRG
1 АГР (Кан.)	1st Air Group (Canada)	3 ан (ФРГ) див - 3	3rd Army Corps (FRG) 3 divisions
1 ада	1st Airborne Division	3 ан (ФРГ) 2 пд, 2,12 тд	3rd Army Corps (FRG) 2nd Infantry Division, 2nd, 12th Tank Divisions
1 пд пбр - 3	1st Mechanized Infantry Division 3 mechanized Infantry brigades	3 ан 2,5 пд, 12 тд	3rd Army Corps 2nd, 5th Infantry Divisions, 12th Tank Division
1 пбр	1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade	3 ВА США	3rd Air Army USA
1 ФР. 1 ФРОНТ	1st Front	3 пбр.	3rd Infantry Brigade
1 эск "П"	1st "P" Squadron	3 ТА	3rd Tank Army
2 А	2nd Army	3 ФР. 3 ФРОНТ	3rd Front
2 ад ФРГ	2nd Air Division FRG	4 А	4th Army
2 ан	2nd Army Corps	4 ав. див. ФРГ	4th Air Division FRG
2 ан пбр - 3	2nd Army Corps 3 Infantry brigades	4 ан (США) див - 3	4th Army Corps (USA) 3 divisions
2 ан (Англ.) див - 2	2nd Army Corps (England) 2 divisions	4 ан 2 брда, 101 авд, 29 пд ФРГ	4th Army Corps 2nd Armored Division, 101st Air- borne Assault Division, 29th In- fantry Division FRG
2 ан (А) 5,6,7 пд	2nd Army Corps (England) 5th, 6th, 7th Infantry Divisions	4 ан (США) 101 авд, 2 брда, [29] пд	4th Army Corps (USA) 101st Airborne Assault Division, 2nd Armored Division, [29th] In- fantry Division
		4 ан (ФРГ) див - 4	4th Army Corps (FRG) 4 divisions

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





# Key to charts

<u>4 ак (ФРГ)</u> 17, 18, 19, 20 пд	<u>4th Army Corps (FRG)</u> 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th Infantry Divisions	<u>7 ак</u> форм. корп. частей	<u>7th Army Corps</u> formation of corps units
4 вад	4th Airborne Division	7 БА	7th Air Army
<u>4 ОТАН</u> 8. самолетов - 1266 носителей - 756	<u>4th Allied Tactical Air Force</u> combat aircraft - 1266 delivery vehicles - 756	7 БА США	7th Air Army USA
4 ТА	4th Tank Army	7 пбр	7th Infantry Brigade
4 ФР, 4 ФРОНТ	4th Front	<u>8 ак (ФРГ)</u> див - 3	<u>8th Army Corps (FRG)</u> 3 divisions
5 А	5th Army	<u>8 ак ФРГ</u> 30, 31, 32 пд	<u>8th Army Corps FRG</u> 30th, 31st, 32nd Infantry Divisions
5 ак	5th Army Corps	8 мсд	8th Motorized Rifle Division
<u>5 ак (США)</u> див - 4	<u>5th Army Corps (USA)</u> 4 divisions	8 пбр	8th Infantry Brigade
<u>5 ак</u> 4, 8 мд, 24 пд, 3 брда	<u>5th Army Corps</u> 4th, 8th Mechanized Divisions, 24th Infantry Division, 3rd Armored Division	9 А	9th Army
<u>5 ак (ФРГ)</u> див - 3	<u>5th Army Corps (FRG)</u> 3 divisions	<u>9 А</u> рез. ГН на ТВД	<u>9th Army</u> reserve of High Command in Theater of Military Operations
<u>5 ак (ФРГ)</u> 14, 15, 16 пд	<u>5th Army Corps (FRG)</u> 14th, 15th, 16th Infantry Divisions	9 мдд	9th Amphibious Landing Division
5 ОА ПВО	5th Separate Air Defense Army	9 ТА	9th Tank Army
<u>5 ОА ПВО</u> 17, 33 н пво	<u>5th Separate Air Defense Army</u> 17th, 33rd Air Defense Corps	10 А	10th Army
5 ФР, 5 ФРОНТ	5th Front	11 ТА	11th Tank Army
6 ак	6th Army Corps	<u>11 ТА</u> рез. ВГН	<u>11th Tank Army</u> Reserve of Supreme High Command
<u>6 ак (США)</u> див - 3	<u>6th Army Corps (USA)</u> 3 divisions	12 БА	12th Air Army
<u>6 ак США</u> [25 тд, 5 мсд, 1 пд]	<u>6th Army Corps USA</u> [25th Armored Div., 5th Mechanized Infantry Div., 1st Infantry Div.]	13 ТА	13th Tank Army
<u>6 ак (США)</u> 5 мд, 25 тд, 1 пд	<u>6th Army Corps (USA)</u> 5th Mechanized Division, 25th Arm. Division, 1st Infantry Division	<u>14 ОА ПВО</u> 32 н, 25, 27 д пво	<u>14th Separate Air Defense Army</u> 32nd Air Defense Corps, 25th, 27th Air Defense Divisions
<u>6 ак (ФРГ)</u> див - 2	<u>6th Army Corps (FRG)</u> 2 divisions	16 мсд	16th Motorized Rifle Division
<u>6 ак ФРГ</u> 22, 23 пд	<u>6th Army Corps FRG</u> 22nd, 23rd Infantry Divisions	17 А	17th Army
6 пбр	6th Infantry Brigade	17 БА США	17th Air Army USA
6 ФР, 6 ФРОНТ	6th Front	17 Н ПВО	17th Air Defense Corps
7 А	7th Army	18 А	18th Army
7 ак	7th Army Corps	19 БА	19th Air Army
<u>7 ак (США)</u> див - 3	<u>7th Army Corps (USA)</u> 3 divisions	19 вад	19th Airborne Division
<u>7 ак (США)</u> 1, 3 мд, 1 брда	<u>7th Army Corps (USA)</u> 1st, 3rd Mechanized Divisions, 1st Armored Division	20 мд	20th Mechanized Division
<u>7 ак (ФРГ)</u> див - 3	<u>7th Army Corps (FRG)</u> 3 divisions	21 БА	21st Air Army
<u>7 ак ФРГ</u> 26, 27, 28 пд	<u>7th Army Corps FRG</u> 26th, 27th, 28th Infantry Divisions	22 А	22nd Army
		22 А рез. ГН на ТВД	22nd Army, Reserve of High Command in Theater of Military Operations
		23 А	23rd Army
		23 А рез. ВГН	23rd Army, Reserve of Supreme High Command
		25 тд	25th Tank Division

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# Key to charts

26 мд	26th Mechanized Division	ГН ТВД	Commander-in-Chief TMO
28 А	28th Army	Д, Д2, Д3, etc.	D, D2, D3, etc.
30 ак	30th Army Corps	 ДА	Long-range aviation
30 ВА	30th Air Army	 ДЕСО	Landing ship detachment
32 А	32nd Army	<u>ЗАПАДНОЕ НАПРАВЛЕНИЕ</u>	Western Axis
32 ак	32nd Army Corps	ак - 17, див - 60	17 army corps, 60 divisions
33 мсд	33rd Motorized Rifle Division	и 4.00 2.6, etc.	by 0400 2 June, etc.
42 тд	42nd Tank Division	и исх. 9.6, etc.	by start of 9 June, etc.
43 А	43rd Army	 КОМ	Convoy
45 А	45th Army	 КТУГ	Ship hunter-killer group
45 А	45th Army	 КУГ	Ship strike group
рез ВМ	Reserve of Supreme High Command	мбр (Нан.)	Mechanized brigade (Canada)
45 тд	45th Tank Division	мд	Mechanized division
56 бр "П"	56th "P" Brigade	мдд	Amphibious landing division
72 мсд	72nd Motorized Rifle Division	мпд	Mechanized infantry division
73 мсд	73rd Motorized Rifle Division	 МРА	Naval reconnaissance aviation (?)
78 тд	78th Tank Division	МС НАТО	NATO naval forces
79 тд	79th Tank Division	мсд	Motorized rifle division
1/81 ак "П"	1/81 Air Regiment "P"	оак	Allied Army Corps
3/84 ак "П"	1/84 Air Regiment "P"	<u>оак</u>	Allied Army Corps
87 тд	87th Tank Division	див - 3	3 divisions
109 вад	109th Airborne Division	<u>оак</u>	Allied Army Corps
125 вад	125th Airborne Division	6 мдд, 13 пд, [Юнл. пд]	6th Mechanized Infantry Division, 13th Infantry Division, [Jutland Infantry Division?]
231 ----	231st [illegible]	[Юнл.]	
295 [одрен]	295th [Separate Long-Range Reconnaissance Air Regiment?]	ОБФ	Combined Baltic Fleet
407 [тран]	407th [Transport Air Regiment]	од	Separate division (?)
444 эрн	444th SAM Regiment	пбр	Infantry brigade
535 [эрн]	535th [SAM Regiment]	с 8.00 8.6, etc.	from 0800 8 June, etc.
1033 [1088] эрн	1033rd [1088th] SAM Regiment	с утра 6.6, etc.	from morning of 6 June, etc.
А	Army	СГА	Northern Army Group
ак	Army corps	<u>СГА</u>	Northern Army Group
Англ. ВВС в ФРГ	British Air Forces in FRG	ак - 7, див - 25	7 army corps, 25 divisions
брмп	Marine brigade	ТА	Tank army
брмп (Англ.)	Marine brigade (England)	ТАН Белг.	Tactical Air Force Belgium
ВА	Air Army	ТАН (Гол.)	Tactical Air Force (Holland)
вад	Airborne division	ТАН Дании	Tactical Air Force of Denmark
ВВС ФРГ в Шл. Гол.	FRG Air Forces in Schleswig-Holstein.	(с) утра 6.6, etc.	from morning of 6 June, etc.
ГН на ЗАП ТВД	Commander-in-Chief in Western Theater of Military Operations	ЦГА	Central Army Group
		<u>ЦГА</u>	Central Army Group
		ак - 8, див - 30	8 army corps, 30 divisions
		ЦЕТ, ЦЕТВД	Central European Theater of Military Operations

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# Key to Geographic Names

1 АВСТРИЯ	Austria	71 Магдебург	Magdeburg
2 Андернах	Andernach	72 Манетин	Manetin
3 Аугсбург	Augsburg	73 Минск	Minsk
4 Балтийск	Baltiysk	74 Млава	Mlava
5 БАЛТИЙСКОЕ МОРЕ	Baltic Sea	75 [Млада]	[Mlade]
6 Бамберг	Bamberg	76 Морьнь	Moryn
7 БЕЛЬТ, ПР. В.	Great Belt	77 Мюльхаузен	Muhlhausen
8 Берлин	Berlin	78 Мюнхен	Munich
9 Бжег	Brzeg	79 Нейвид	Neuwied
10 Бонн	Bonn	80 Ноктен	Nochten
11 Бранденбург	Brandenburg	81 Одра	Oder R.
12 Братислава	Bratislava	82 Олешино	Oleszino [Oleszno]
13 Брекендорф	Brekendorf	83 Оломоуц	Olomouc
14 Бремен	Bremen	84 ОРКНЕЙСКИЕ О-ВА	Orkney Islands
15 Бремерхафен	Bremerhaven	85 Осло	Oslo
16 Брест	Brest	86 [Осовцы]	[Osovtsy]
17 БССР	Belorussian SSR	87 [Пацов]	[Pacov]
18 Быдгощ	Bydgoszcz	88 Перлеберг	Perleberg
19 Бытув	Bytow	89 Пльзень	Pilsen
20 Варшава	Warsaw	90 ПНР	Polish PR
21 Вейден	Weiden	91 Познань	Poznan
22 Вейпрты	Vejprty	92 Прага	Prague
23 Вена	Vienna	93 Пружаны	Pruzhaný
24 Вентспилс	Ventspils	94 Премысль	Przemysl
25 Вильгельмсхафен	Wilhelmshaven	95 Рашувка	Raszowka
26 Вильнюс	Vilnius	96 Регенсбург	Regensburg
27 Висла	Vistula R.	97 Рейн	Rhine R.
28 ВНР	Hungarian PR	98 Рига	Riga
29 Высоков	Vysokoye	99 Рокницани	Rokycany
30 Гамбург	Hamburg	100 Росайт	Rosyth
31 Ганновер	Hannover	101 Росток	Rostock
32 Гданьск	Gdansk	102 Рось	Ros [Ross]
33 Гдыня	Gdynia	103 Роттердам	Rotterdam
34 Гера	Gera	104 Рыбник	Rybnik
35 Глен-Дуглас	Glen Douglas [Faslane]	105 Свентошув	Swietoszow
36 Гливице	Gliwice	106 Свиноуйсьце	Swinoujscie
37 Гомуа-Велкопольски	Gorzow Wielkopolski	107 СЕВЕРНОЕ МОРЕ	North Sea
38 ГОТЛАНД	Gotland	108 Скерневице	Skierniewice
39 Гродно	Grodno	109 Сокулка	Sokolka
40 Дубенка	Dubienka	110 Старичи	Starichi [form. Stazhiska]
41 Зальцбург	Salzburg	111 Стэвнс	Stevens [Stavns Cliff]
42 Зебниц	Sebnitz	112 СФРЮ	SFR Yugoslavia
43 Зелена-Гора	Zielona Gora	113 Таллин	Tallin
44 Зольтау	Soltau	114 Темплин	Templin
45 ЗУНД, ПР.	Oresund	115 Тирstrup	Tirstrup
46 Инороцлав	Inowroclaw	116 Торунь	Torun
47 ИТАЛИЯ	Italy	117 Ужгород	Uzhgorod
48 Калининград	Kaliningrad	118 УССР	Ukrainian SSR
49 Калундборг	Kalundborg	119 Устка	Ustka
50 Каменьск	Kamensk	120 Фленсбург	Flensburg
51 Карлсруэ	Karlsruhe	121 Флоренвилль	Florenville
52 Каруп	Karup	122 ФРАНЦИЯ	France
53 Клайпеда	Klaipeda	123 Фурт-Им-Вальд	Furth im Wald
54 Колобжег	Kolobrzeg	124 ФЮНЕН	Fyn
55 Колсоо	Kolsaas	125 Фюрстенберг	Furstenberg
56 Констанц	Konstanz	126 Хельсинки	Helsinki
57 Копенгаген	Copenhagen	127 Черновцы	Chernovtsy
58 Корса[r]	Korsor	128 г. Черхов	Cerchov Mountain
59 Латв. ССР	Latvian SSR	129 Чоп	Chop
60 Легница	Legnica	130 ЧССР	Czechoslovak SSR
61 Лейпциг	Leipzig	131 Шамотулы	Szamotoły
62 [Либерец]	[Liberec]	132 Швейниц	Schweinitz
63 Ливерпуль	Liverpool	133 ШВЕЙЦАРИЯ	Switzerland
64 Лиепая	Liepaya	134 ШЕТЛАНДСКИЕ О-ВА	Shetland Islands
65 [Липско]	[Lipsko]	135 Эйзенах	Eisenach
66 [Лиса]	[Lysa]	136 Эльба	Elbe R.
67 Лит. ССР	Lithuanian SSR	137 Эст. ССР	Estonian SSR
68 Лодзь	Lodz	138 Яворов	Yavorov
69 Лондон	London	139 Ягель	Jagel
70 Львов	Lviv		

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